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A Standing Question: Mortgages, Assignment, and
Foreclosure
Eric A. Zacks and Dustin A. Zacks*
"Banks are neither private attorneys general nor bounty hunters, armed with a roving
commission to seek out defaulting homeowners and take away their homes in satisfaction
of some other bank's deed of trust. "
This Article examines the judicial treatment of mortgage assignments across various
jurisdictions in the foreclosure context. Although some courts do permit debtors to
challenge suspicious or problematic assignments, most have ignored such problems and
denied standing to debtors attempting to assert assignment-based defenses. This is
particularly surprising given the widespread and well-documented problems with
foreclosure "robo-litigation, " including backdated documents, fraudulent notarizations,
and unauthorized signatures. Despite the abuse of process by foreclosing entities, courts
have permitted foreclosures to continue unabated and, in some instances, have even
precluded the possibility of discovery to debtors seeking to ensure that title and
assignments are legally valid. Judicial ambivalence about formal compliance by mortgage
assignors and assignees in the foreclosure context is somewhat ironic given most courts'
routine enforcement of instruments against debtors who do not formally comply with all
contractual terms. Current adjudicative approaches to mortgage assignment are seemingly
disconnected from the devastating reality of the home mortgage crisis and its causes.
Moreover, there are several rationales that would support a more robust enforcement of
technical compliance with assignment procedures, including the need for procedural
equity, title certainty, and public records integrity. Thus, as evidence exists that banks are
still making many of the same problematic mistakes regarding transfer documentation,
courts can perform an essential monitoring role as an important spur towards reform.
Although it would not address all of the underlying causes of the housing crisis, an
adjudicative approach that liberally permits challenges to mortgage assignments would
encourage lenders and servicers to be more circumspect in their foreclosure processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Determining when to require strict and formal compliance with procedures or process
when adjudicating substantive rights is, admittedly, a difficult problem. The procedures
protecting contract or property rights can be administered conservatively or liberally,
depending on the adjudicator's disposition or opinion regarding the proper substantive
outcome. When important or even fundamental rights are involved, adjudicators, in their
ostensibly neutral or impassive roles, should reasonably be expected to refrain from
prejudging the merits of any such litigation. This may be particularly true in those instances
when the ex ante transaction process, as well as the ex post enforcement process, was
dominated by only one party.
This dilemma has played out in fantastic fashion during the mortgage foreclosure
crisis. First, lenders and their originators were able to assign and transfer loans with few,
if any, restrictions. 2 When the housing market crashed, mortgagees and their assignees,
again utilizing the formal instruments of contract that dictate when a party has defaulted
under an obligation, sought to foreclose upon the residential properties. 3 In the rush to
originate and assign as many mortgages as possible, and in the face of an overwhelming
volume of foreclosures to be processed, mortgagees and their assignees often failed to
assign the mortgages properly and, in some instances, committed fraud or other
unauthorized acts in order to correct the assignment paper trail.
4
These are not merely hypothetical or isolated issues. The crash of the housing bubble
brought countless documentation issues to light in the foreclosure context. 5 One such
2. Alan M. White, Losing the Paper - Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection,
24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 486 (2012) (detailing the many methods for transferring notes and mortgages).
3. Nolan Robinson, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)
to Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2011) ("One unfortunate byproduct of the
subprime mortgage crisis has been a dramatic increase in the number of American homeowners facing
foreclosure."); Ruth Simon, Banks Ramp Up Foreclosures-Increase Poses Threat to Home Prices: Delinquent
Borrowers Face New Scrutiny, WALL ST J., Apr. 15, 2009, at Al ("Some of the nation's largest mortgage
companies are stepping up foreclosures on delinquent homeowners. That will likely lead to more Americans
losing their homes just as the Obama administration's housing-rescue plan gets into gear. J.P. Morgan Chase
&Co. [sic], Wells Fargo &Co. [sic], Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac all say they have increased foreclosure activity
in recent weeks. Those companies say they have lifted internal moratoriums which temporarily halted
foreclosures.").
4. See generally White, supra note 2, at 492 (detailing the questionable methods of assignment with
respect to home mortgages).
5. See, e.g., Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867 (2013) (describing assignment
problems caused by lenders, law firms, and their respective agents).
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"lightning rod" for criticism was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS),
the corporation utilized as a mechanism by which lenders and servicers were able to
document loan transfers electronically and to produce assignments more easily while
avoiding recording requirements. 6 Even law firms representing allegedly malfeasant
lenders did not escape the foreclosure documentation problems unscathed.
7
The oft-alleged documentation errors are not relevant solely to individual litigants and
law firms, but to the housing market as a whole. The factory-like production of assignments
assisted lenders in securitizing loans more easily and inexpensively, which ostensibly
lowered mortgage costs and increased home ownership during the rise of the American
real estate market in the 2000s.8 These increased numbers of assignments mean that
increased enforcement of formality in assignments, then, could potentially affect the
housing market in a significant way through altering the foreclosure process on a large
number of delinquent loans.
If a judicial system intends to treat debtors as being responsible for complying with
the terms of the mortgage contract itself, it would be reasonable to expect that system to
demand that the other parties to the contract abide by similar formalism. In somewhat
counterintuitive fashion, however, courts have permitted mortgagees and their assignees to
subvert, supplant, and circumvent the very formalities that they utilize to foreclose upon
the debtors in the first place. 9 The legal system attempts to enforce loan contracts and the
underlying mortgages against debtors in almost each instance, regardless of the predatory,
subprime, complex, or hidden nature of the terms of the home loan. 10 The basis for this
enforcement is that the debtor executed a formal instrument, and one of the basic rules of
contract law is that the executing party will be bound by the contract that she executes even
if she did not read it. I Regardless of how substantively unfair the home loan transaction
may appear, classical and neo-classical contract law theory, as well as certain economic
schools of thought, suggest enforcement is appropriate based on the "voluntariness" of the
transaction. 12 Nevertheless, the concern for enforcement and formalism unexpectedly
6. Scot J. Paltrow, Facing Criticism, MERS Cuts Role in Foreclosures, REUTERS (July 27, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-mers-foreclosure-idUSTRE76Q67L20110727
7. Zacks, supra note 5, at 867.
8. Robinson, supra note 3, at 1634 ("MERS's popularity among its members is not surprising, given that
over ninety-five percent of residential mortgages are securitized. Mortgage industry leaders are quick to point out
the system's benefits to both lenders and borrowers. As noted above, before MERS was created, the process of
assigning a mortgage was burdensome and costly, as each assignment had to be individually drafted and recorded
in the proper county clerk's office. Lenders incurred substantial transactional costs, which they passed on to their
customers. By one account, these expenses added an extra thirty dollars to the price of the average residential
mortgage transaction, and even more if mistakes were made.").
9 See infra Section I11 (discussing the challenges that debtors face in raising defenses to foreclosures).
10. See infra Section 111 (discussing the challenges debtors face in raising issues of fraud and voidability
with respect to home loan contracts).
11. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26 (4th ed. 2004) ("A party that signs an agreement is
regarded as manifesting assent to it and may not later complain about not having read or understood it, even if
the agreement is on the other party's standard form").
12. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 300 (1986) ("In sum, legal
enforcement [of a contract] is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily performed acts that conveyed
her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable rights."); Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (2004)
("[Elconomists in general and legal economists in particular have indeed applied dispositionist assumptions
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melts away when it is the foreclosing party that has not complied with all of the formalities
of the contracting process. 13
Accordingly, this Article examines the judicial treatment of mortgage assignments
across various jurisdictions in the foreclosure context. To date, courts have been unable to
generate a cohesive framework for addressing deficiencies in assignments of mortgage-
related documents. 14 Courts have adopted a variety of approaches, none of which appears
to recognize the need for procedural fairness, title certainty, and public records integrity. 15
Although some courts do permit debtors to challenge suspicious or problematic
assignments, most courts have ignored such problems and prevented debtors from ensuring
and demanding contractual compliance.
16
For example, many courts begin with the basic proposition that a third party cannot
assert rights or defenses under a contract that belong to another party. 17 Accordingly, if a
court views the contract assignment as a distinct contract between the assignee and the
assignor, then the obligor under the original contract cannot complain about defects in the
purported assignment.18 The right to raise such complaints would belong to the assignor
and, in the absence of such complaints, the assignee is free to enforce the contract against
the obligor as if the assignee were the assignor. 19 In the mortgage assignment context, this
has led many courts to conclude that debtors do not have any standing to raise questions
about the validity of mortgage assignments, regardless of whether such assignments
occurred prior to the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings.
20
The basic problem in this approach, however, is that it assumes that the assignment is
valid. It is not (as some have claimed) as though the debtor is demanding that the assignee
prove that the assignment is valid; instead, the debtor herself is asking permission to
unflinchingly--that is, without the self-suspicion and rigorous inspection that social science would demand....
[Blecause their dispositionist assumptions seem so intuitively plausible, and so fundamental to our sense of
ourselves, that they are beyond question."); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:
Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 576 (1999) (observing
that "[tihe classical ideal of 'freedom of contract' depends entirely on an obviously unrealistic model of contract
formation where all transactions are negotiated by sophisticated, fully-informed parties of equal bargaining
power, capable of protecting their own self-interests and of arriving at mutually beneficial agreements that will
maximize utility for both parties .... Unfortunately, this model and its underlying assumptions do not reflect
reality") (citation omitted).
13. See infra Section 111 (discussing difficulties debtors face raising defenses to enforcing a contract when
title certainty, procedural fairness, or public records issues arise).
14. See infra Section III (discussing issues debtors face in voiding contracts where there are title
deficiencies).
15. Infra Sections III and IV.
16. See infra Section III (discussing most courts' reluctance to allow such challenges dunng foreclosure
proceedings).
17. See, e.g., Livonia Prop. Holdings, LLC v. 12840-12976 Farmington Rd. Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp.
2d 724, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (noting that a party must generally "assert his own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties" (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975))).
18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LORD, 29 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 74:50 (4th ed. 2003) ("[T]he debtor has
no legal defense [based on invalidity of the assignment] ... for it cannot be assumed that the assignor is desirous
of avoiding the assignment.").
19. Livonia Prop. Holdings, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 737.
20. See id. (holding that the borrower did not have standing to challenge whether the assignments were
valid); see infra Part Ill (describing how a plaintiff can establish standing).
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demonstrate that as a matter of law the assignment is not valid. It is not clear why a debtor,
particularly one in the circumstances of being foreclosed upon, should not have the chance
to prove assertions that a fundamental document permitting the foreclosure is invalid.
Some courts, of course, have recognized this problem and have sought to find a middle
ground by distinguishing between void and voidable assignments. 2 1 Under this line of
reasoning, a debtor would have standing to raise defenses that would demonstrate that an
assignment was void and without legal effect. Correspondingly, a debtor would not have
standing to raise a defense voiding the assignment if the assignor would have to exercise
the defense to void the assignment (i.e., that the assignment would be legally valid if the
assignor did not decide to raise the voidable defense). 23
The void versus voidable distinction has had appeal across a number of jurisdictions,
but it has sometimes led to confusing and inconsistent results. For example, in some courts,
an unauthorized signature on an assignment would render an assignment void, while in
other courts it would merely render it voidable. 24 Similarly, some courts have held that a
false signature does not render an assignment void while others have found that it does.
25
Based on their conclusions about void versus voidable defenses, courts then either permit
or deny debtors the standing to raise such defenses in their foreclosure proceedings.
This approach has some significant drawbacks as well as the aforementioned
inconsistencies. To a large extent, the distinction merely begs the question of what kind of
assignment should be respected to permit an assignee to enforce the contract against the
obligor. The principle that a void assignment, unlike a voidable assignment, should not be
respected does not suggest how to make a sensible distinction between the two in the
context of mortgage assignments. Many courts appear to conclude that there are many
fewer defenses that render an assignment void as opposed to voidable, which leaves the
system in much the same place as the basic approach outlined above of denying standing
to debtors.
In similar fashion, some courts use a "chain of title" approach, wherein a debtor has
standing to raise a defense if it could demonstrate that the assignee never had good legal
21. See, e.g., Dernier v. Mortg. Network, Inc, 87 A.3d465,473 (Vt. 2013) ("While we have never so held,
courts in other states have qualified this strong proposition in the case of assignment of debts, explaining that a
debtor may challenge the assignment of his or her debt if it is void or entirely ineffective--even if that means
allowing a 'stranger to a contract' to assert reasons related to the breach of that contract. They have been careful
to emphasize, however, that this exception does not allow a debtor to challenge an assignment of the debt that is
merely voidable.").
22. Id at 474.
23. Id.
24. Chhun v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc, 84 A.3d 419, 423 (R.I. 2014) (noting that plaintiffs
"alleged that the one person who signed the mortgage assignment did not have the authority to do so.... These
allegations, if proven, could establish that the mortgage was not validly assigned, and, therefore, Aurora did not
have the authonty to foreclose on the property"); but see Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co, 735 F.3d
220, 226 (5th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Texas Supreme Court clarified that a contract executed on behalfofa corporation
by a person fraudulently purporting to be a corporate officer is, like any other unauthonzed contract, not void, but
merely voidable at the election of the defrauded pnncipal").
25. Mruk v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 82 A.3d 527, 537 (R.I. 2013) ("If correct [that, inter alia,
the signature was false], any assignment of the mortgage and subsequent foreclosure would be invalid, ineffective,
or void."); but see Davis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., I F. Supp. 3d 638, 644 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding no
standing for the debtor based on forgery allegations (on the part of the assignor's purported agent)).
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title. 26 As with the void versus voidable distinction, the chain of title analysis turns on what
kinds of defenses a court considers sufficient to impair legal title. Courts disagree whether
a missing or defective assignment is sufficient, and different jurisdictions have different
standards for determining chain of title as well.2 7 The fact that MERS is utilized as the
nominal mortgagee for many note holders also has led to conflicting opinions. 28 As with
the other approaches above, many courts have found that very few types of defects impair
title, and often courts severely restrict the type of evidence of that can be utilized or
investigated by the debtor to contest title.
29
More problematically, these approaches are plagued by the transparent (and often
admitted) governmental motivation to clear backlogs of foreclosure cases as soon as
possible for funding or political reasons.30 As a result of this desire, the judicial approach
often appears to be based on doing a preliminary assessment of whether the debtor is in
fact delinquent in repaying the loan, and if so, denying many, if not all, procedural defenses
or even the initial standing to raise such defenses. In this view, given that the foreclosure
should happen in a particular instance (because the debtor is delinquent), and that the
judiciary and other public officials have determined that foreclosure cases need to be
handled expeditiously to reduce the backlog, judges apparently decide that it makes sense
to permit the purported assignee to foreclose regardless of irregularities in the assignment
process or chain of title.
For example, even courts that follow the general rule precluding third-party standing
to challenge a contract seem to evaluate the merits of the complaint before finding a lack
of standing to challenge assignments. 31 In some instances, debtors may lack standing where
26. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Citimortgage, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (recognizing such a
defense); Miller v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 881 F. Supp. 2d 825, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (same).
27 Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 354 (1 st Cir. 2013) (debtor had standing to challenge
because the debtor alleged "that MERS, as a mere 'nominee' for [the lender], never possessed a legally
transferable interest in Woods's mortgage, rendenng any attempted assignments void," but ultimately the court
concluded that MERS did have such a legally transferrable interest); Miller, 881 F. Supp. 2d, at 832 (allowing
challenges to chain of assignments through which a lender asserts the right to foreclose); but see Livonia Prop.
Holdings v. Farmington Rd. Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746-47 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (chain of title is
established exclusively through review of public records).
28 Woods, 733 F.3d at 354 (concluding that MERS did have a recognizable legal interest in the mortgage
to transfer); but see Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 283 (2011) ("In sum, because MERS was never
the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected
assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the
plaintiff. Consequently, the plaintiff failed to show that it had standing to foreclose."); In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231,
250 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding MERS was not a proper mortgagee, therefore, it could not legally assign
mortgage).
29. See infra Part Ill (arguing that courts generally do not permit debtors to assert defenses relating to the
validity of assignment of notes unless there are special circumstances).
30. See, e.g., FORECLOSURE INITIATIVE WORKGROUP, FORECLOSURE BACKLOG REDUCTION PLAN FOR
THE STATE COURTS SYSTEM, FLORIDA COURTS (Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.flcourts.org/core/
fileparse.php/25 1/urlt/RecommendationsForeclosurelnitiativeWorkgroup.pdf [hereinafter FORECLOSURE
INITIATIVE WORKGROUP] (establishing proposals to assist in clearing a backlog of foreclosure cases, including
actively propelling cases towards judgment).
31. See Rishoi v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 13-1119,2013 WL 6641237, at *6(6th Cir. Dec. 17,
2013) ("Even when all of the Rishois' allegations on appeal are accepted as true, they cannot prevail.... The
Rishois have made no showing of fraud, nor have they pleaded or proved prejudice resulting from any irregularity
in the foreclosure proceedings as would warrant setting the sheriff's sale aside").
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they fail to show "prejudice as a result of any lack of authority of the parties participating
in the foreclosure process," especially when debtors "do not dispute that they are in default
,,32
under the note. Since the debtors are in default, there is skepticism about permitting the
debtor to assert defense of the original lender (assignor), as "there is no reason to believe
that . . . the original lender would have refrained from foreclosure in these
circumstances. ' 33 This kind of previewing is not unique to homeowner claims regarding
assignments; rather, this kind ofjudicial skepticism has been noted in the context of MERS'
ability to foreclose in its own name as well.34
These largely deferential judicial approaches to mortgage assignees are particularly
troubling given the widespread and well-documented problems with foreclosure "robo-
litigation," including backdated documents, fraudulent notarizations, and unauthorized
signatures. 35 Despite the abuse of process by mortgage assignees, courts have permitted
foreclosures to continue unabated and, in some instances, may even foreclose the
possibility of discovery to debtors seeking to avoid an improper foreclosure. 36 The lack of
insistence on formal compliance by mortgage assignees in the foreclosure context is
somewhat ironic given most courts' routine enforcement of instruments against debtors
who do not comply in all technical respects with their loan agreements. Current
adjudicative approaches to mortgage assigmnent are seemingly disconnected from the
reality of the home mortgage crisis, its causes, and the abuses within the foreclosure
process.
Moreover, there are several rationales that would suggest a more robust enforcement
of technical compliance with assignment procedures, including the need for procedural
equity, title certainty, and public records integrity. Thus, as ample evidence exists that
banks are still making many of the same transfer documentation mistakes, courts can
provide an important spur towards reform.3 7 Although allowing such challenges may not
provide a solution to the underlying causes of the housing crisis, the benefits of allowing
such challenges provide a sound rationale for allowing challenges. Elsewhere in the real
estate context, tenant protection statutes providing procedural protections evolved from
judicial and legislative recognition of the need to protect the less sophisticated and weaker
party.38 Nevertheless, these same concerns are not necessarily considered by the judiciary
32. Siliga v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
33. Id.
34. Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, andAccuracy
in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV 551, 571 (2011) (In one case, "the court reasoned that the original lender
would not have disbursed the loan funds if it had not assented to MERS being named as nominee on the related
mortgage. Similarly, many courts will correctly assume that a lender or successor owner would not buy a MERS
loan if it did not assent to MERS remaining its nominee with the associated rights to foreclose.").
35 See generally Zacks, supra note 5.
36 See infra Part Ill (describing how courts first look at if debtors have standing prior to determining the
validity of debtors' claims regarding invalid assignments).
37. Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States- The Ibanez Time Bomb?,
4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 111, 127 (2013) (suggesting that banks have not reformed their practices in the
years after the robo-signing scandal).
38. Mary B. Spector, Tenants' Rights, Procedural Wrongs- The Summary Eviction and the Need for
Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 165 ("Dunng the last half of the twentieth century, courts and legislatures greatly
expanded the scope of tenants' rights by imposing numerous new obligations on landlords, during the term of the
lease, that were unknown at common law.").
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in their foreclosure decisions, which can result in the loss of an individual's domicile. 39
Similarly, shoddy documentation has led to title concerns, yet faulty title implications are
often downplayed by courts. 40 Finally, scholars have argued that faulty assignments have
contributed to the undemocratic downgrading of public records integrity. 4 1 In this view,
accurate public records are a public right implicating transparency and accuracy
42
requirements that have been democratically enacted. Allowing faulty assignments to be
recorded and enforced, unchallenged, may eliminate the courts as a functional monitor
enforcing public records accuracy and transparency.
43
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines how contract assignments are
relevant in the foreclosure process as well as different abuses or errors in the mortgage
assignment process. Part III examines different adjudicative approaches to problematic or
defective assignments and critiques the deference courts have shown to suspicious
assignment procedures in the name of easing backlogged foreclosure dockets. Part IV
explains the repercussions arising from such judicial treatment and makes a normative case
for a more liberal standing recognition for debtors challenging mortgage assignments. Part
V concludes by offering alternative approaches to examining assignments that respect the
contract rights of both mortgage holders or assignees and the mortgagor.
II. ASSIGNMENTS AND MORTGAGES
Aside from notes and mortgages themselves, perhaps no agreement is as pivotal to the
modem foreclosure process as the written assignment. Mortgage originators have used
assignments to transfer title and the rights to enforce notes and mortgages. 44 As a result of
the assignability of these instruments and agreements and of the newly emergent MERS,
lenders were able to securitize loans more easily and inexpensively, which ostensibly
lowered mortgage costs and increased home ownership during the rise of the American
39. Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Take an Emotional Toll on Many Homeowners, USA TODAY (May
16, 2008), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2008-05-14-mortgage-
foreclosures-mental-healthN.htm?csp=99 ("People tend to catastrophize, and that leads to depression. Suicide
rates go up. We see an increase in drinking, outbursts at work, violence toward kids."); Aleatra P. Williams, Real
Estate Market Meltdown, Foreclosures and Tenants 'Rights, 43 IND. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (2010) ("Scholars have
described security of tenure as 'a critically important human need.' [citation omitted]. Tenants vested with
secunty of tenure have certain benefits, such as a sense of community and roots.").
40 White, supra note 2, at 496; Siliga v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. Inc., 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500, 508
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (downplaying the risk of an improper assignment where the debtors have admitted to
defaulting on the underlying loan).
41 See, e g., Christopher Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359 (2010) (discussing the history and issues of the MERS system);
Dustin A. Zacks, Revenge of the Clerks: MERS Confronts County Clerk and Qui Tam Lawsuits, BANKING & FIN.
SERV. POL'Y REP. 32:1 (Jan. 2013) (describing challenges to the MERS system).
42 See Peterson, supra note 41, at 1397 (analyzing the legislative goals behind MERS).
43 White, supra note 2, at 495-96 (describing title problems that arise due to the validity of mortgage
satisfactions); Peterson, supra note 41, at 1405 (describing title issues that can anse from MERS involvement in
the mortgage assignment process).
44. White, supra note 2, at 471 ("Most mortgage loans made between 1990 and 2007 were sold on the
secondary market, and then ultimately resold to securities investors through a process known as securitization. As
a result, the bank or mortgage company to whom the homeowner originally promised to make payments had to
assign its rights in the Note, which is the contract promising payment, and the Mortgage, which is the conveyance
of an interest in real estate as secunty for the loan.").
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real estate market in the 2000s.45 Of course, hindsight has led many to question if lenders
overlooked the creditworthiness of borrowers in the rush to originate loans for
securitization or if those loans were based on properties being systematically overvalued.46
Much like the securitization process itself, the foreclosure process often relies on the
assignability and assignments of mortgages.
47
A mortgage is generally construed under the rules of construction applicable to
contracts; accordingly, this Section addresses the basic contract law treatment of
assignability and assignment of contracts.4 8 A contract right is generally understood and
accepted as being freely assignable. 49 These rights could include all rights of the assignor
under the contract, including the right to receive the benefits of the obligor's performance
as well as the ability to seek damages if the obligor fails to perform. In the context of most
mortgages, the mortgagor has granted a security interest in the real property to the
mortgagee, which security interest is intended to secure the mortgagee's payment or
performance obligations under a promissory note. The obligations of the mortgagor as well
as the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage, including with respect to foreclosing
upon that security interest, would thereby be expected to be assignable. Accordingly, under
state law, there generally is nothing impermissible with a mortgage originator assigning its
rights with respect to the mortgage or other agreements.
50
Moreover, even if the default or presumption were against assignability, most lender-
originated documents, including notes and mortgages, expressly permit the lender to assign
its rights under the agreements to third parties. 51 Given the importance of the ability to
assign such loans, particularly in the era of securitization, it would be important for loan
45. Robinson, supra note 3, at 1622 ("As the market for mortgage-backed securities grew, mortgage lenders
and investment banks sought to make the transfer of residential mortgages cheaper and easier, and so MERS was
born.").
46 Former Citigroup CEO's Subprime Folly Cost $120B, Investors Say, 14 No. 10 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES
LITIG. REP. 9 at *I (Mar. 31, 2008) ("Dunng the housing market boom, many lenders gave out billions of dollars
in mortgages to borrowers with shaky credit or overvalued homes and issued securities called 'collateralized debt
obligations' and 'structured investment vehicles' that were tied to the value of the subprime loans.").
47. White, supra note 2, at 472 ("Ifa homeowner defaults on a mortgage loan, the party that purchased the
rights to the loan will want to enforce the mortgage by foreclosure, to obtain valid title to the home and to sell it.
Purchasers of the foreclosed home likewise will expect that the party foreclosing and selling the house had the
legal right to do so and that the resulting title is valid and not subject to later challenges. Invalid transfers of the
mortgage or note may or may not impair the validity of title, depending on various rules that balance policies of
accuracy and integrity against policies of finality and certainty."); David E Peterson, Cracking the Mortgage
Assignment Shell Game, 85 FLA. B.J. 10, 14 (Nov. 2011) ("It should come as no surprise that the holder of the
promissory note has standing to maintain a foreclosure action. Further, an agent for the holder can sue to foreclose.
The holder of a collateral assignment has sufficient standing to foreclose.")
48. 5 BANKING LAW § 120.02 ("Construction of a mortgage is governed by the same rules of interpretation
applicable to contracts generally ....").
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (providing that "[a] contractual right can be
assigned" except in a few instances); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 870 (1952) ("The
effectiveness of an assignment does not depend on the assent of the obligor.").
50 See generally Peterson, supra note 47 (descnbing the multiple ways to assign a mortgage under vanous
laws).
51 See, e.g., Form 3023, Michigan Single Family Uniform Instrument, FANNIE MAE (2001), available at
https://www fanniemae.com/singlefamily/security-instruments (Section 20 states: "The Note or a partial interest
in the Note (together with this Secunty Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to
Borrower.").
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originators to secure this contract right. Accordingly, each time a loan is sold, an
assignment contemplating the transfer may be executed.
In addition, notes and mortgages often allow for MERS to be deemed the mortgagee
as the nominee for the lender and its eventual successors or assigns. 52 In effect, this
translates to homeowners assenting not only to loan and mortgage transfers, but also to
consenting to MERS remaining the mortgagee no matter how many times the loan is
transferred. 53 This consent arguably eliminated the need to produce and record many
assignments that otherwise would have previously been required upon each transfer,
rendering securitization easier and less expensive in time and costs.
54
In both MERS and non-MERS mortgages, assignments may be produced in a number
of circumstances. First, as described above, a simple sale of the loan may result in a
mortgage assignment being produced and recorded, either at the time of the transfer or
later. Second, in the case of MERS loans, MERS will assign the mortgage out of its name
and into the name of the eventual foreclosing entity. Finally, assignments may be
produced in conjunction with the requirements of pooling and servicing agreements
governing residential mortgage-backed securities. 56 When confronting these assignments
in courts, litigants and judges often disregard their importance. 57 Yet in many cases, beyond
the notes and mortgages themselves, assignments will be the key piece of evidence proving
or disproving a bank or servicer's right to sue upon a defaulted loan.
Purported assignments may be suspect or doubtful for a number of reasons. First,
loans may have been assigned in a tardy fashion, meaning that the effective date of the
assignment was after the date a foreclosure action was initiated or otherwise not in
compliance with the timelines required by the terms of pooling and servicing agreements.
58
Either of these failures can have severe implications for the foreclosing entity. In some
cases, the failure of the entity to show that it acquired the loan before the inception of
foreclosure proceedings can prove fatal to proving standing to foreclose. 59 As such,
52. Robinson, supra note 3, at 1622-23 ("[Tlhe lender names MERS as mortgagee, but 'solely as
nominee'-meaning only as an agent-for the lender, and for the lender's 'successors and assigns ' If the lender
subsequently assigns the mortgage to another MERS member, the assignment need not be recorded because the
new owner is among the original lender's 'successors and assigns."').
53 For a comprehensive description of the development and basic tenets of the MERS pathway, see
generally Peterson, supra note 41 (outlining the creation of the MERS pathway as a response to the subprlme
mortgage crisis); Zacks, supra note 34 (providing a detailed analysis of the history and role of MERS).
54. Zacks, supra note 34, at 555 ("Recording a mortgage in the name of MERS as nominee for the lender
and its assigns means that lenders do not have to deal with the lengthy, error-prone, and expensive process of
drafting and recording assignments every time the underlying ownership of the mortgage changes. Regardless of
how many times the underlying ownership in the loan is transferred, MERS remains the mortgagee of record.").
55. Id. at 551 ("MERS's name is also brought into [foreclosure] actions when an assignment of a mortgage
is produced from MERS to the foreclosing or moving entity."); White, supra note 2, at 486-87 ("[T]here seems
to be a general practice among foreclosure attorneys to record a mortgage assignment from MERS to the party
bringing the foreclosure action, shortly before or after filing the foreclosure ... .
56. Id. at 594 n.232.
57. Id. at 582-83 ("The mere fact that the foreclosing bank or servicer now has possession of an alleged
original note is enough for many courts to ignore the finer distinctions of MERS assignments.").
58. Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Dirt Lawyers, Dirty REMICs, 27 PROB. & PROP. (May/June 2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate-property-magazine_2012/2013/may_
june_2013/article borden reiss dirt lawyers and dirtyremics.html.
59. See, e.g., McLean v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) ("[A]
party's standing is determined at the time the lawsuit was filed.").
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homeowners' attorneys may attack assignments that post-date foreclosure proceedings to
argue that the assignee cannot prove standing.60 While assignees may eventually be able
to refile or reinstitute proceedings dismissed on such a basis, the cost of extending the
foreclosure process is an expensive externality of assignments that post-date foreclosure
filings.
6 1
A related challenge concerning timing of assignments implicates the securitization
process. In some cases, delinquent borrowers can argue that a pooling and servicing
agreement itself cannot effectively replace a valid assignment as proof that a particular loan
is owned by a securitized trust. 62 In other cases, borrowers may argue that an assignment
that post-dates a trust's "closing date" (the date after which a trust may not accept new
loans into the trust in order to avoid tax implications) is invalid or ineffective, given the
terms of the trust's governing pooling and servicing agreement. 63 Although few such
arguments appear capable of ultimately preventing foreclosure, the potential liability and
cost of potential dismissals or defeated foreclosures remains, and the faulty timing and
documentation of securitization has opened lenders up to massive investor lawsuits
alleging negligent securitization processes.
64
"Robo-signing" has also occurred in the assignment context. 65 To date, scholars have
typically only considered robo-signing as it pertains to sworn affidavits submitted to courts
in foreclosure cases. 66 Scholars have cited these affidavits because the affiants failed to
view any documentation before signing affidavits containing factual allegations, referred
to incomplete or incorrect payment histories, permitted other persons to sign their names
to affidavits, or failed to adhere to notarization requirements. 67 But others have asserted
68similar challenges in the context of assignments as well. In one notable case, attorneys
from the Florida State Attorney General's office alleged that in some instances, the
individuals who executed particular assignments may not have had authority to execute
assignments, may not have actually signed the assignments themselves, or may have
60. See, e.g, Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ("When the alleged
assignment was finally produced, it was dated ... some four months after the lawsuit was filed .... [A]ppellees'
complaint could not have stated a cause of action . . . based on a document that did not exist some four months
later." (emphasis omitted)).
61. Dustin A. Zacks, The Grand Bargain: Pro-Borrower Responses to the Housing Crisis and Implications
for Future Lending, 57 LOYOLA L. REV. 541, 567 (2011) (noting that "such cost increases are venfiable and not
insubstantial")
62. Renuart, supra note 39, at 136 (discussing cases where "the PSA [pooling and servicing agreement]
failed to describe adequately the specific mortgage loans specified in the deal" and as a result "the foreclosure
sales by the trustee bank were not lawful").
63. See, e.g., Roy D. Oppenheim & Jacquelyn K. Trask-Rahn, Deconstructing the Black Magic of
Securitized Trusts, 41 STETSON L. REV. 745, 757 (2012) ("[M]ortgage[s must] be transferred to the trust within a
certain time frame .... After such time, the trust and any subsequent transfers are invalid.").
64. Borden & Reiss, supra note 58.
65. FLORIDA STATE ATT'Y GEN. REPORT, UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE AND UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS tN
FORECLOSURE CASES (2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/46278738/Florida-Attomey-General-
Fraudclosure-Report-Unfair-Deceptive-and-Unconscionable-Acts-in-Foreclosure-Cases.
66. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the Robo-Sign
Scandal, 64 ME. L. REV. 17 (2011) (analyzing the robo-signing scandal in the context of several foreclosure
cases).
67. Id at 26.
68. FLORIDA STATE ATTN'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 65.
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simply signed the assignments without having any knowledge of what they were signing.
69
The Florida State Attorney General's report exemplifies such challenges through an
explication of one particularly notorious assignment-signer, Linda Green, whose signature
appears on "hundreds of thousands of mortgage assignments." 70 Ms. Green was apparently
appointed to sign assignments on behalf of dozens of companies.7 1 Her signature's
appearance varies widely from assignment to assignment. 72 In a national television
interview, Ms. Green asserted that she was appointed as a vice president for so many banks
because "her name was short and easy to spell.",73 Concerns regarding robo-signing in the
assignment context are therefore significant, even if not as notorious in the popular press
as challenges to foreclosure affidavits.
Aside from what may be procedural or technical errors or faults, there are questions
about the substance of the transfers assignments purport to represent. For example, the
Florida Attorney General Report highlights instances of assignees improperly named or
documented with unlikely effective dates far in the future such as "9/9/9999.
"74
Questionable assignments have appeared in cases where the assignee also signed as the
assignor, in cases where multiple assignments conflict with one another, and in cases where
assignments were not executed.7 5 Accordingly, not merely formalities or dates of transfer
may cause minor problems to foreclosing entities; rather, some assignments may not assign
to anyone, or may not have an effective date that is supported in fact.
The development of the MERS system has also generated novel challenges to
assignments. First, some advocates have challenged assignments on the basis that MERS
signed as nominee of the original lender, long after that original lender became defunct.
76
Second, MERS registry's listing of who the investor is on a given loan does not always
match the entity foreclosing in court, giving rise to obvious questions about the veracity of
any corresponding MERS assignment.
77
In addition, some have challenged the MERS appointment system, in which servicers
or other subscribers to the MERS system, including law firms, can appoint their own
69. See Gregg H. Mosson, Robosigning Foreclosures: How It Violates Law, Must Be Stopped, and Why
Mortgage Law Reform Is Needed to Ensure the Certainty and Values of Real Property, 40 W. ST. U. L. REv 31,
41 (2012) ("Robosigning is most completely constituted in four phenomena: (1) a conspiracy to mass-
manufacture documents; (2) often accompanied by sworn affidavits signed under false pretense, and falsely
verifying the documents as genuine and supported by the signer's review of their factual grounds; (3) to create
the appearance of procedural compliance as a condition precedent to enforcing a legal right; (4) and then attorneys
submit these falsifications to courts to hasten and win judgments for their own and clients' benefit").
70. FLORIDA STATE ATIN'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 65.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Shira Ovide, Watch '60 Minutes' Take on Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J. DEAL JOURNAL BLOG, (Apr.
4, 2011), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/04/04/watch-60-minutes-take-on-foreclosure-crisis/).
74. FLORIDA STATE ATTN'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 65 (highlighting questionable assignments,
including one where the assignee was named as "BOGUS ASSIGNEE FOR INTERVENING ASMTS").
75. See generally White, supra note 2 (detailing questionable assignment practices).
76. See Zacks, supra note 34, at 553 ("in the public records, MERS remains the mortgagee or beneficiary
for the life of the loan, regardless of how many times the original lender transfers the underlying interest ....
This informational disparity created by MERS means that, for example, homeowners cannot look to the public
records to determine who currently owns the beneficial interest in their loan, as they could before the ascendancy
of MERS.").
77. White, supra note 2, at 487.
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employees as officers of MERS for the purpose of executing assignments. 78 This unique
system has led to various bank witnesses admitting that they have little, if any, knowledge
of MERS or of what interests in loans, if any, MERS possessed before or after
assignment. 7 9 MERS also has admitted that it does not receive consideration for
assignments, yet such assignments routinely list a nominal sum. 80 Finally, some MERS
assignments state that they transfer the mortgage together with the note, yet MERS has
admitted that such language is without meaning, as MERS never has an interest in
promissory notes to transfer.
81
Thus, when the purported transferee or its agent attempts to foreclose upon the subject
property under the mortgage, the debtor may raise a number of defenses that essentially
stem from a title issue, specifically, whether the transferee has valid title to the contract
such that it may be permitted to exercise the foreclosure remedy specified in the contract.
Moreover, even prior to the defenses being raised, the debtor may request discovery with
respect to these assignment issues so that it may determine whether any such defenses are
available. It may be intuitive that the party purporting to exercise a particular right (the
foreclosure rights afforded to it under the contract) should be forced to prove that it has
valid title to such right (in this instance, that the assignment of an admittedly valid contract
was valid).
For example, an individual would generally be permitted to assert a lack of title or
possessory interest (and to seek discovery on the issue) against a party that is seeking to
assert a trespassing claim against her arising from her incursion into a particular piece of
real property. 8 2 Even in the contract world, one would expect to be able to raise an issue
of proof (and to seek discovery on the issue) with respect to the rights that another party is
asserting have been exercised. For example, if a contract party asserted that it has properly
exercised a particular option in a contract (e.g., an option to terminate the contract), the
other party would be permitted in court to challenge and seek discovery regarding whether
the option was properly exercised in accordance with the terms of the contract.8 3 In this
light, assignment and assignability is simply a permission option under the terms of the
contract, one perhaps of many options permitted thereunder. Whether such option was
actually exercised would seem to be a properly contestable issue in the litigation context.
Of course, with respect to assignments, the challenge will be made against the assignee
(not the original party to the contract), but it is not immediately apparent why the rights
under the contract should be any less contestable because there is a purported successor-
78. Id. at 488.
79. Zacks, supra note 34, at 588.
80. Id.
81. MERS' Statement Explaining the Nature of Its Business and Providing a Status Report on Its Case
Audits at n. 20, In re Cartier, Case No. 04-15754 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 12, 2008).
82. DAVID A. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.06 (Thomas ed., 2013) ("Not only could
such a defendant not make an unauthorized entry on property owned by the defendant (except in certain
landlord/tenant situations), but a plaintiff without ownership or right of possession of that land would not have
the fight to bnng such a trespass action. For this defense, however, it is required that the defendant affirmatively
establish title rather than merely show weaknesses in the plaintiffs title.").
83 See, e.g., Marens v. Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35, 41 (D. Md. 2000) (allowing plaintiff
to seek discovery of "documents relating to defendant's exercise of an option to purchase an interest in the
defendant ... limited partnership," albeit in a more reasonable alternative method of discovery than originally
requested).
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in-interest.84 Nevertheless, state courts use a number of approaches to address the
assignment issue with respect to mortgages and related agreements, many of which favor
the assignor and assignee and prevent the debtor from asserting defenses or even seeking
discovery relating the validity of the assignment.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENTS
A. Standing: A General Absence
When debtors raise the defense of an improper assignment, courts typically begin by
examining whether the debtor has standing to assert such a defense. It is generally
understood that third parties generally cannot assert rights or defenses under another's
contract. 85 The obligor under the contract may be entitled to raise particular defenses to the
extent that such defenses arise under the contract itself, but the obligor may not object to
the assignment of the contract because the obligor is not a party to the assignment
contract. 86 This does not apparently deprive the obligor of any rights because the obligor
still retains all of the original defenses it had under the original contract. 87 The assignment,
however, does not increase the obligor's number of defenses simply because the assignor
chose to assign the contract.
88
84. Zacks, supra note 34, at 562 (finding that, in the cases analyzed, "MERS rarely, if ever, plead holder in
due course status"). This is particularly so because so few foreclosing entities are apparently availing themselves
of suing in the capacity of Holder in Due Course, which would allow successors immunity from claims against
the original lender.
85. See Livonia Property Holdings, LLC v. 12840-12976 Farmington Rd. Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d
724, 737 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that a "litigant who is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge
that assignment").
86. See, eg., LORD, supra note 18, at § 74:50 ("[T]he debtor has no legal defense [based on invalidity of
the assignment] ... for it cannot be assumed that the assignor is desirous of avoiding the assignment "); Pagosa
Oil & Gas, LLC v. Marrs & Smith P'ship, 323 S.W.3d 203,212 (Tex. App. 2010) (finding lessor lacked standing
to challenge assignment of lessee's breach of lease action because lessor was not party or third-party beneficiary
to assignment contract); Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345, 347 (1878) (holding that, where the parties to an
assignment act in accordance with the assignment, and there is no evidence that either party to the assignment
objects so as to create a hostile title, a third party to the assignment cannot challenge its validity).
87. 7 SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE § 14-30 (2d ed. 2007) ("By the assignment of a
contract, the debtor cannot be deprived of any legal or equitable defenses that subsist in the contract, unless the
assignment provides that the debtor is precluded from asserting against the assignee any defense that the debtor
may have or acquire."); LORD, supra note 18, at § 74:56 ("[T]he assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor, and,
unless the transaction is a commercial transaction in which the account debtor has agreed in advance by way of
an enforceable waiver of defense clause, not to assert any claim or defense it may have against the assignor as
against the assignee, the assignee will be subject to claims, claims in recoupment, and defenses of the account
debtor."); B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Ch. I § 735 (4th ed. 2005) ("The assignment merely
transfers the interest of the assignor. The assignee 'stands in the shoes' of the assignor, taking his or her rights
and remedies, subject to any defenses that the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the assignment.")
88. See. e.g., Glass v. Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530, 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ("In a suit by the assignee on
a claim against the obligor, the defense that the assignee occupied a fiduciary relationship to the assignor cannot
be urged by the obligor, nor can the defense of lack of consideration for the assignment be urged by the obligor
in a suit on the assigned claim.") (internal citations omitted); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 167 (1932)
("An assignee's right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the obligee's right, to all absolute and
temporary defenses thereto, and to all set-offs and counterclaims of the obligor which would have been available
against the obligee had there been no assignment, provided that such defenses and set-offs are based on facts
existing at the time of the assignment, or are based on facts arising thereafter prior to knowledge of the assignment
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Using this line of reasoning, courts have been generally reluctant to permit debtors to
assert defenses relating to the validity of an assignment of a note or mortgage absent special
circumstances. For example, Michigan courts have held that a contract party "may not
challenge the validity of assignments to which it was not a party or third-party beneficiary,
where it has not been prejudiced, and the parties to the assignments do not dispute (and in
fact affirm) their validity." 89 This theory is based on a "prudential limitation" on standing
that a party must generally "assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." 90 A mortgagor's interest is
in avoiding foreclosure, whereas the assignment only touches on to whom the mortgagor
is obligated, not whether the mortgagor owes the obligation.9 1 Therefore, the mortgagor
cannot step into the shoes of the mortgagee to assert the mortgagee's rights.
92
by the obligor.").
89. Livonia Property Holdings, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 737; see also Maraulo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 12-CV-
10250, 2013 WL 530944 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2013) (holding that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge
assignment especially "[g]iven that the assignor does not exist, Plaintiffs are not at any risk of paying the same
claim twice, and have never alleged that they are at risk of such double payment."). Other jurisdictions have
followed substantially similar approaches. See, e.g., Silving v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 11-0676-PHX-
DGC, 2012 WL 135989 (D. Ariz. Jan. 18,2012) (dismissing the case for lack of standing because "Plaintiffs have
alleged no facts to show they suffered a concrete and particularized injury from the Substitution that allowed First
American, rather than MERS, to initiate foreclosure. Nor have Plaintiffs alleged facts to show that MERS, as the
principal party to the Substitution, has sought to have it voided for lack of authorization."), aff'dsub nom. Silving
v. America's Servicing Co., 552 F. App'x 684, 685 (9th Cir. 2014); Lizza v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No.
CIV. 13-00190 HG-BMK, 2014 WL 794752 (D. Haw. Feb. 27, 2014) (holding Plaintiffs lack standing because
"Hawaii's foreclosure law, like Michigan law, does not permit mortgagor-plaintiff standing to challenge an
assignment. Courts interpreting Hawaii law have only permitted a plaintiff-mortgagor to challenge an assignment
that was made by an entity that no longer existed at the time of the assignment, as such an assignment would be
void"); Brown v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No. 2:13-CV-02107-JTF, 2013 WL 4500569 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 19,
2013) (holding that Plaintiffs lack standing because "Plaintiffs myriad of arguments regarding the validity of the
assignments never allege that his duties have altered or that he may risk double liability. In fact, it is not clear
from the Complaint what detrimental effect any of the assignments allegedly would have upon Plaintiff.").
90. Livonia Property Holdings, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 735. See also Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v Lansing Bd.
of Educ., 487 Mich. 349, 378 (2010) (discussing Michigan's long-standing prudential approach); HSBC Bank
USA, NA v. Young, No. 313212, 2014 WL 3529418, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. July 15, 2014) (holding that debtor
lacked standing when she failed to redeem within redemption period: "once the six-month redemption period
expires without the mortgagor having exercised her nght to redeem, all of the mortgagor's 'right[s], title, and
interest' in and to the property are extinguished."); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1106 (Utah 2013) (noting
that Utah follows Michigan's prudential approach; "The same is true of Utah's constitution and jurisprudence.").
91. Ifert v. Miller, 138 B.R. 159, 166 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (applying Texas law) ("[The underlying
contract] is between [Obligor] and [Assignor]. [Assignor's] assignment contract is between [Assignor] and
[Assignee]. The two contracts are completely separate from one another. As a result of the assignment contract,
[Obligor's] rights and duties under the [underlying] contract remain the same: The only change is to whom those
duties are owed .... [Obligor] was not a party to [the assignment], nor has an cognizable interest in it. Therefore,
[Obligor] has no right to step into [Assignor's] shoes to raise [its] contract rights against [Assignee]. [Obligor]
has no more right than a complete stranger to raise [Assignor's] rights under the assignment contract").
92. Liu v. T & H Mach., Inc., 191 F.3d 790, 797 (7th Cir. 1999) (determining that a party to an underlying
contract lacks standing to "attack any problems with the reassignment" of that contract); Blackford v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 101 F. 90, 91 (8th Cir. 1900) ("As long as no creditor of the assignor questions the validity of the
assignment, a debtor of the assignor cannot do so."); LORD, supra note 18, at § 74:50 ("[T]he debtor has no legal
defense [based on invalidity of the assignment] . . for it cannot be assumed that the assignee is desirous of
avoiding the assignment."); Popov v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. l:12-CV-00170-DCN, 2012 WL
5364301, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2012) ("In the instant case, the only party challenging the assignment of the
mortgage is the Plaintiff, Paul Popov. As the Plaintiff is not a party to the assignment, he lacks standing to
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Although this approach, on its face, makes intuitive sense and comports with
longstanding contract law doctrine, it is inherently incomplete. In this context, it is not
necessarily logical to assume that the assignor would never (or would not often) want to
raise particular assignment defenses. For example, assume that the original lender never
actually assigned the mortgage, the assignment was signed without authority, or the
assignment was forged or fraudulent. In any of those instances, one would assume that the
assignor would actually want to raise the defense.
The larger point here is that the assumption that an assignor would not want to raise a
particular defense only makes sense if the assignor is alive or exists (if a corporate entity,
like many lenders) and is aware of the purported assignee's exercise of the contractual
rights. If neither of those facts is true, then it does not make sense to assume that the
assignor would forego raising defenses related to the propriety of the assignment. If the
assignor no longer exists, then the absence of any objection to the assignment or the
exercise of the contractual rights by the purported assignee actually means nothing. Since
the assignor has no ability to communicate, it does not make sense to make an
assumption-that the assignment is acceptable to the assignor-based on the assignor's
lack of communication.
Similarly, if the assignor exists but is not aware of the proceeding in which the
purported assignee is asserting that the assignment is valid, the assignor's lack of
communication regarding the assignment does not signify acceptance or ratification of the
assignment. Since the assignor, not typically a party to foreclosure proceedings, is thereby
precluded from indicating one way or another whether the assignor would like to raise a
defense to the assignment, it is illogical to assume that the assignor would refrain from
doing so. Moreover, the question of the assignment's validity is not simply an issue of
whether a third party to the assignment (the obligor) should be able to exercise another
party's (the assignor's) defenses. It also concerns whether a third party to the original
mortgage (the purported assignee) should be able to exercise another party's (the
assignor's) rights against another third party (the obligor). In this instance, the obligor is
not a disinterested third party seeking to enjoy the benefits of an assignment contract to
which it is a party; instead, it is attempting to ensure the obligations of the original contract,
to which the assignment contract relates, are actually owed to the party demanding
performance. In the abstract, it certainly does not make sense for a third party to enjoy the
benefit of another's contract. In the foreclosure context, though, it certainly seems intuitive
that the debtor should be able to defend itself by asserting that the purported assignee is
not a proper assignee, particularly when the assignor no longer exists or is not a party to,
or is otherwise unaware of, the proceeding.
B. Void v. Voidable: A Deferential Approach
Many courts attempt to structure their approach to debtor standing to challenge
assignments based on an analysis of whether the defense would render the assignment void
or voidable. Under this line of analysis, a debtor would have standing to raise defenses that
challenge the transfer of the mortgage from MERS to Deutsche Bank .... Plaintiff is not discharged of his
contractual obligation to pay that mortgage just because it has been transferred from one mortgagee to another."),
appeal dismissed (June 19, 2013).
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would demonstrate that an assignment was void ab initio.93 On the other hand, a debtor
would not have standing to raise a defense voiding the assignment if the assignment would
be valid unless the assignor voluntarily decided to raise the defense. 94
This line of analysis ap ears defensible because it is consistent with the contract law
theory discussed previously,35 specifically that third parties should not have the ability to
assert rights or defenses under another party's contract. Accordingly, if the assignor would
have to assert affirmatively the defense to void the assignment, then the obligor should not
be able to defend its obligations under the contract by asserting such defense when the
assignor has refrained from doing so. The right to assert the defense is personal to the
assignor, and the assignor's abstention from asserting the defense suggests that the
assignment should be respected as legally binding.
On the other hand, this line of analysis does recognize that certain types of purported
assignments should not and do not have legal effect, regardless of the intention or desire
of the assignor. Such purported assignments are void ab initio and it would be appropriate,
under this approach, to permit an obligor to raise a defense to that effect. 9 6 This approach
93. See, eg, Demierv. Mortg. Network, Inc., 87 A.3d 465,473 (Vt. 2013) ("While we have never so held,
courts in other states have qualified this strong proposition in the case of assignment of debts, explaining that a
debtor may challenge the assignment of his or her debt if it is void or entirely ineffective-even if that means
allowing a 'stranger to a contract' to assert reasons related to the breach of that contract. They have been careful
to emphasize, however, that this exception does not allow a debtor to challenge an assignment of the debt that is
merely voidable.").
94. See Calderon v. Bank of Am. N.A., 941 F. Supp. 2d 753, 767 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (where plaintiffs did
"not have standing to challenge an assignment to which they were not a party unless that assignment was void.
Because the transfer of the Note, if indeed it violated the PSA, would merely be voidable, Plaintiffs [did] not have
standing to challenge it."); Coleman v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 3:12-CV-4783-M BH, 2014 WL
3827493, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2014) (holding that a plaintiff-debtor lacked standing because lack of actual
signing authority makes the transaction merely voidable); 17 C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 4 (noting "a void contract...
is no contract whatsoever ... and cannot be validated by ratification" and "[a] contract that is merely voidable is
capable of being confirmed or ratified by the party having the right to avoid it"); Onyekwere v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., No. 3:13-CV 2557-B, 2014 WL 1032447, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2014) ("For instance, an assignment
is voidable in circumstances involving the statute of frauds, fraud in the inducement, lack of capacity as a minor,
and mutual mistake. An assignment is void when it is completely invalid, meaning the assignee did not have
authority under the deed to foreclose.") (internal citations omitted); Clark v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
C.A. No. 12-802-M, 2014 WL 1259954, at * 1 (DR.I. Mar. 27, 2014) ("Rhode Island Supreme Court applied the
void versus voidable distinction in the context of a mortgage and held that a mortgage is only voidable by the
mortgagee even if the agent of the mortgagee acted without authority."); In re Holden, 271 N.Y. 212, 2 N.E.2d
631 (1936) ("The assignments were valid upon their face. The assignee was the legal owner of the claims assigned.
No one could question the validity of the assignments except the assignors."); Wood v. Germann, 331 P.3d 859
(Nev. 2014) ("although a post-closing-date loan assignment violates the terms of the PSA, these courts conclude
that such an assignment is not void, but is merely voidable, because the trustee has the option of accepting the
loan assignment despite its untimeliness."); Giuffre v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. CIV.A. 12-11510-
JLT, 2013 WL 4587301 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2013), aff'd 13-2222, 2014 WL 3512860 (July 17, 2014) ("Giuffre
has most likely sufficiently alleged that the mortgage originated from fraud in the inducement. But this only
renders a mortgage voidable, not void.").
95. Supra Part III.A.
96. See Dernier, 87 A.3d at 473 (agreeing with the reasoning that "a debtor may assert as a defense any
matter which renders the assignment void or invalid" (citing Tri-Cities Constr., Inc. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,
523 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975))); Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282, 291 (1st
Cir. 2013) ("We hold only that a mortgagor has standing to challenge a mortgage assignment as invalid,
ineffective, or void (if, say, the assignor had nothing to assign or had no authority to make an assignment to a
particular assignee). If successful, a challenge of this sort would be sufficient to refute an assignee's status qua
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is seemingly more flexible than the general approach discussed above (that does not
recognize an obligor's ability to challenge assignments) because the former at least
recognizes the possibility of standing when purported assignments are void (as opposed to
voidable).
This analysis, however, is subject to many of the same flaws outlined previously. 97
For example, in instances where the assignor does not exist or is unaware of the foreclosure
proceeding, it does not necessarily make sense to assume that the assignor would not desire
(or would not have desired) to raise the voidable defenses had the assignor still been in
existence or been aware of the foreclosure proceeding. In addition, the obligor is not a
disinterested third party attempting to assert rights or defenses of another that are unrelated
to the third party, but instead is attempting to ensure that a separate third party (the
assignee) is in fact entitled to assert rights against, or impose duties upon, the obligor.
Moreover, this approach merely begs the question of what kind of assignment should
be respected to permit an assignee to enforce the contract against the obligor. Based on
their conclusions about void versus voidable defenses, courts then either permit or deny
debtors the standing to raise such defenses in their foreclosure proceedings. If it is a
potentially void assignment, then the court may grant standing to challenge the assignment,
while the court may deny standing in the case of a voidable assignment. In practice, many
courts appear to conclude, particularly in this newly developing area of law, that there are
few defenses that render an assignment void as opposed to voidable, which leaves the
system in much the same place as the basic approach outlined above of denying standing
to debtors. 98 Accordingly, although the void versus voidable distinction has had appeal
across a number ofjurisdictions, it has sometimes led to confusing and questionable results.
For example, courts do not agree regarding whether a false or forged signature (on
behalf of the assignor) causes an assignment to be void as opposed to voidable. 99 The
mortgagee."); Giuffre, 2013 WL 4587301, at *3 ("To show that the mortgage is void, Giuffre must demonstrate
that it was procured through fraud in the factum. But Giuffre has not alleged any facts suggesting that the parties
failed to understand the 'essential nature of the document[s]' they signed."); In re Sutter, 665 F.3d 722, 728 (6th
Cir. 2012) ("[U]nder Michigan law, a forged mortgage is void ab initio.... More recent Michigan cases have
confirmed this pnnciple and emphasized that parties that take possession of interests granted by the forged
instrument, even if they do so innocently, have no rights under the forged document.... Mortgages are treated in
the same manner as deeds under Michigan law, and equally grant no interests to the holder of a forged
mortgage."); GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Chan, 56 A.D.3d 521,522 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("A deed based on forgery
or obtained by false pretenses is void ab initio, and a mortgage based on such a deed is likewise invalid.").
97. Supra Part lIl.A.
98. See, e.g, Kim v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 825 N.W.2d 329, 336-37 (Mich. 2012) ("We have long
held that defective mortgage foreclosures are voidable .... (citing Kuschinski v. Equitable & Central Trust Co.,
277 Mich. 23,268 N.W. 797 (1936)) ' The better rule seems to be that such sale is voidable and not void... The
total lack of equity in plaintiffs claim, his failure to pay anything on the mortgage debt and his laches preclude
him from any relief in a court of equity.' Similarly, in Feldman v. Equitable Trust Co., the Court held that a
foreclosure commenced without first recording all assignments of the mortgage is not invalid if the defect does
not harm the homeowner.").
99. Mruk v. Mortg Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 82 A.3d 527, 537 (R.I 2013) ("If correct [that, inter alia,
the signature was false], any assignment of the mortgage and subsequent foreclosure would be invalid, ineffective,
or void."); GMAC Morig. Corp., 56 A.D.3d at 522 ("A deed based on forgery or obtained by false pretenses is
void ab initio, and a mortgage based on such a deed is likewise invalid"); Witelson v. Jamaica Estates Holding
Corp. 1, 56 A.D.3d 328, 328 (N.Y. 2008) ("Those plaintiffs ... are not entitled to foreclose because, crediting
Kanoff's testimony, the court found that the signature on those assignments was forged and that therefore the
assignments are unenforceable."); U.S. Bank, N.A., v. Arizmendy, 44 Misc 3d 1223, *2 (2014) (the court found
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underlying theory regarding denying standing to an obligor challenging an assignment falls
apart when a document that is not based on the consent of the assignor can be used to
impose obligations on the obligor. The presence of a forged or falsified signature
completely undermines the rationale's underlying assumptions about the assignor's
intentions or desires to assert particular contract defenses, particularly where the assignor
is not aware of the foreclosure proceedings or the assignor no longer exists. It also paints
a very different picture about the obligor as a disinterested third party attempting to assert
another party's contractual rights or defenses. Where the obligor is going to have duties to
another party imposed upon it based on a falsified document, the obligor appears to be an
interested and relevant figure. Accordingly, the void versus voidable dichotomy may not
be very helpful if it is merely a way for courts to characterize preconceived notions about
the propriety of a particular foreclosure proceeding.
Similarly, courts have disagreed about whether an unauthorized signature on behalf
of the assignor invalidates the assignments or merely makes it voidable. 10 0 As with forged
defendant failed to raise this defense in the statutorily prescribed period, but the court noted that "[alithough the
Defendant does not offer forensic handwriting analysis or expert testimony to validate its allegations of forgery,
the markedly different signatures may reasonably be deemed a forgery by the trier of fact. As such, the Defendant
has a meritorious defense."). Cf Davis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., I F. Supp. 3d 638, 643 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (finding no standing for the debtor based on forgery allegations (on the part of the assignor's purported
agent)); Coleman, 2014 WL 3827493, at *1 (holding that the assignment was not void because "Plaintiffs
allegation that the assistant secretary's signature does 'not match,' fails to raise a reasonable inference that she
has standing to challenge MERS's assignment to BNYM "); Gorski v. CTX Mortg. Co., No. 12-CV-1 2250, 2013
WL 1316931, *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge assignment
where the plaintiff alleged fraudulent documents signed by robo-signers: "Specifically, Plaintiff fails to set forth
facts showing that the robo-signing of the documents has tainted the foreclosure by actionable fraud. Without
factual support, these allegations are conclusory and vague.").
100. Chhun v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 423 (R.I. 2014) (noting that plaintiffs
"alleged that the one person who signed the mortgage assignment did not have the authority to do so ..... These
allegations, if proven, could establish that the mortgage was not validly assigned, and, therefore, Aurora did not
have the authority to foreclose on the property"); Mruk, 82 A.3d at 527 (finding that the lack of authority by
signer on behalf of assignor would invalidate the assignment), Sullivan v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 7 N.E. 3d 1113,
1116 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (holding that a mortgagor had standing to challenge assignments because of an
unauthorized signature: "[N]owhere on the face of the instrument is there any indication or evidence that Flowers
[the signer] was, or in any manner purported to be, an officer or other authorized agent of Saxon. Nor can the
notarial acknowledgment supply the missing evidence; it merely recited that Flowers acknowledged that she
executed the assignment 'in [her] duly authorized capacity,' without describing what that capacity might be, or
with whom. Proof of Flowers's authority to assign the mortgage on Saxon's behalf (to the extent she was
authorized) accordingly requires more evidence than appears either on the face of the second assignment or in the
record." Cf Reinagel v. Deutche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 735 F.3d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Texas Supreme
Court clarified that a contract executed on behalf of a corporation by a person fraudulently purporting to be a
corporate officer is, like any other unauthorized contract, not void, but merely voidable at the election of the
defrauded principal."); Applin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust, No. CIV.A. H-13-2831, 2014 WL 1024006, at *5
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2014) (finding that "[MERS's] alleged lack of authority, even accepted as true," did not
provide standing to challenge the assignment); In re Lopez, 486 BR. 221, 229 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (Although
the court upheld debtor's standing based on debtor's injury, court found there was no unauthorized signature
because "[u]nder Massachusetts law, an assignment of a mortgage is effective without the need to independently
establish the [signatory] authority of the assignor to make the assignment."); Portillo v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc.,
No. CIV. 13-2370 DWF/JSM, 2014 WL 1431394, at *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 14, 2014) (held that plaintiffs failed to
provide evidence of any unauthorized signatures. Even if plaintiffs alleged false signatures, "plaintiffs suffered
no injury in fact as a result and therefore, lack standing to pursue a quiet title claim on this basis."); Coleman,
2014 WL 3827493, at *2 (holding that plaintiff-debtor lacked standing because lack of actual signing authority
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signatures, the presence of an unauthorized signature undercuts the basis for the law's
assumption that an unaware or defunct assignor would not have desired to assert particular
contract defenses. In addition, it suggests that the debtor is in fact an innocent third party
seeking to ensure that an unauthorized document does not require it to render services to
an improper party.
The void versus voidable line of analysis has theoretical appeal because of its
consistency with the law's reluctance to permit third parties to assert personal rights under
another party's contract. As discussed above, however, this approach rests on suspicious
foundations, particularly where the assignor is not aware of the enforcement action or the
assignor no longer exists. In addition, the lack of understanding or discussion surrounding
the basis for using the dichotomy has emboldened courts to render decisions that
completely undercut that basis. By so doing, courts eliminate the desirability of using it.
Thus, where fraudulent or unauthorized signatures and similar troubling fact patterns fail
to impress upon the judiciary that the obligor is not a disinterested third party attempting
to gain the advantage of another party's contractual rights or defenses, the void versus
voidable line of analysis proves unhelpful at best and destructive at worst.
C. Legal Title: Few Standing Issues
Another defense that a debtor seemingly would be able to raise is whether the assignee
of a mortgage has proper title to the property interest reflected thereby. If, for example, the
assignor never had legal title to the property interest, then the assignee would not have been
able to receive legal title because the assignor did not have any legal interest to convey.101
Similarly, if the title to the property interest has not been recorded as required by statute,
this could destroy the requisite chain of title. 102 This is more of a statutory claim suggesting
that a defect in procedurally demonstrating that recorded title has passed from each
assignor to the purported assignee threatens the last assignee's ability to exercise property
rights. In the most egregious instances, a court may recognize standing where no
assignment exists. 103 In one instance, a court determined that the debtor's assertion that the
makes the transaction merely voidable).
101. Bowen v. Brogan, 119 Mich. 218, 220 (Mich. 1899) ("If this amount was paid, it is evident there was
nothing due upon the mortgage when it was foreclosed, and the right to foreclose it did not exist, and no legal
title was obtained by the foreclosure"); 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 419 ("The transfer of a forged note will give the
transferee no rights in the mortgage securing it."); MetLife Home Loans v. Hansen, 48 Kan. App. 2d 213, 213
(Kan. Ct. App. 2012) ("[l]n order to grant summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action, the district court
must find undisputed evidence in the record that the defendant signed a promissory note secured by a mortgage,
that the plaintiff is the valid holder of the note and the mortgage, and that the defendant has defaulted on the
note.").
102. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 651 (Mass. 2011) (holding that the foreclosing party
lacked recordable interest in mortgage: "A foreclosing entity may provide a complete chain of assignments linking
it to the record holder of the mortgage, or a single assignment from the record holder of the mortgage.... The
key in either case is that the foreclosing entity must hold the mortgage at the time of the notice and sale in order
accurately to identify itself as the present holder in the notice and in order to have the authority to foreclose under
the power of sale) (internal citations omitted); Minn. Stat. § 580.02(3) (standing to foreclose under Minnesota's
non-judicial foreclosure law requires... "that the mortgage has been recorded and, if it has been assigned, that
all assignments thereof have been recorded...").
103. Ortiz v. Citimortgage, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 581,587 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that debtor had standing
to challenge whether the assignment was invalid because "the court must accept the pleaded facts as true" that
there was no "evidence regarding the assignment of the note and deed of trust, and the assignment was not
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purported assignee could not demonstrate an assignment would provide standing to
challenge the validity of the assignment.I14 If the assignment is legally ineffective as a
matter of law because the assignor never had a property interest to convey, or because the
assignment does not exist, then the debtor would have standing to assert the defense. As
with defenses that render an assignment void, the assignor's presupposed intent with
respect to making an effective assignment is irrelevant when the issue is whether an
assignment actually exists or whether the assignor ever owned title to the property interest
in the first place.
A court could also recognize standing to challenge the assignment when the assignee
cannot demonstrate proper chain of title. If the assignee cannot demonstrate that the
mortgage was actually owned and then properly transferred by each successive assignee,
then the debtor should be permitted to challenge the assignee's title to the mortgage. As
in an instance where no assignment exists, these sorts of defenses rely on the inability of
an assignor somewhere in the chain of title to have conveyed title or lack of evidence that
an assignor conveyed title at all. Again, the assumed intent of the assignors to have
conveyed title is not relevant to the legal issue of whether the assignor conveyed title where
no evidence of such transfers exist.
Nevertheless, courts typically limit the ability of a debtor to raise legal title or chain
of title defense because of the prevailing assumption that the debtor is not harmed if an
improper party forecloses when the debtor is in default. 106 Courts appear to assume that
recorded in the Hams County property records"); Johns v. Gillian, 134 Fla. 575, 581 (Fla. 1938) ("Although the
assignment of the mortgage from Everglade Lumber Company to Gillian was defectively executed, it may be
taken as evidence to show that the company had, before the commencement of the suit, sold and transferred to
Gillian its entire interest in the note and mortgage. A mere delivery of a note and mortgage, with intention to pass
the title, upon a proper consideration, will vest the equitable interest in the person to whom it is so delivered.")
(internal citations omitted); Ogilvie v. First Nat'l Bank, 179 Okla. 11, 111 (Okla. 1937) ("Neither does the failure
to allege the assignment of the mortgage from the original mortgagee to plaintiffs render the judgment void. The
mortgage securing a note is merely incident and accessory to the note, partakes of its negotiability so that the
indorsement and delivery of the note secured by the mortgage carries the mortgage with it without formal
assignment thereof."). 59 C.J.S MORTGAGES § 419 ("Ordinarily, the assignment of a note evidencing a debt
automatically carries with it, as an incident, the assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust upon real estate or
chattels that secure its payment, provided that there is nothing in the contract to the contrary. Under this rule it is
not necessary that there be a transfer or delivery of the mortgage papers or, in order that the beneficial interest
shall pass, that a separate written or formal assignment be made.").
104. See supra Part II1.B (discussing defenses which render an assignment void as opposed to voidable).
105. Miller v. Homecomings Fin. LLC, 881 F. Supp. 2d 825, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (allowing challenges to
chain of assignments through which a lender asserts the right to foreclose); SunTrust Mortg. Inc. v. Giardina, No.
109,840, 2014 WL 1193433, at *7 (Kan Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2014) (unpublished opinion) ("Because the holder of
a note retains a beneficial interest in the mortgage, a formal assignment from MERS, as nominee, is unnecessary
to secure the nght to foreclose."); Berry v. Main St. Bank, 977 F. Supp 2d 766, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2013) ("While
[p]laintiff has standing to challenge whether Wells Fargo held record chain of title, [p]laintiff 'lacks standing to
challenge that assignment."'); In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) ("Consequently, the
documents submitted with the proof of claim do not by themselves show a valid assignment of rights from Argent
to Deutsche Bank and do not fully support the asserted claim. It follows that the proof of claim is not supported
by documents adequate to establish the assignment of rights on which it is based, and therefore that the claim
does not enjoy prima facie validity. In the alternative, whatever prima facie validity the claim initially enjoyed
was rebutted by the Debtor's pointing out of the defect in the chain of title that was evident in the documents
submitted with the proof of claim.").
106 Bowen v. Brogan, 119 Mich. 218, 220 (Mich. 1899) ("If this amount was paid, it is evident there was
nothing due upon the mortgage when it was foreclosed, and the right to foreclose it did not exist, and no legal
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foreclosure should happen if the debtor is in default, even if the foreclosing party is not the
correct party to foreclose. 10 7 Accordingly, debtors may lack standing where they fail to
show "prejudice as a result of any lack of authority of the parties participating in the
foreclosure process," especially when debtors "do not dispute that they are in default under
the note."
1 ° 8
Similarly, there is skepticism about permitting the debtor to assert a defense of the
original lender (assignor), when "there is no reason to believe that ... the original lender
would have refrained from foreclosure in these circumstances."10 9 This kind of previewing
is not unique to homeowner claims regarding assignments; rather, this kind of judicial
skepticism has been noted in the context of MERS' ability to foreclose in its own name as
well.1 10 Based on such skepticism, courts have declined to permit challenges to MERS'
ability to receive or convey legal title, even though its ability may be very dubious.
11 I
title was obtained by the foreclosure"); but see Keyes v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 921 F. Supp. 2d 749,
757 (E.D. Mich. 2013) ("The complaint supports the concern that the plaintiffs might be subject to double liability
because the mortgage and note have been assigned to different parties. The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that
the note was sold to a trust, and that the mortgage was assigned to defendant Deutsche Bank as trustee for that
trust. However, the foreclosure process was initiated, although not completed, by defendant Bank of America. In
order to complete the foreclosure, the mortgage would have to be assigned to Bank of America. The note would
then be in the hands of the Trust and the mortgage in the hands of Bank of America. In such a situation, the
plaintiffs will be permitted to challenge the validity of the assignment."); Bambas v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 13-
2195, 2014 WL 4057857, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2014) ("Although the record of the mortgage is muddled with
irregularities, none of them supports setting aside the foreclosure as Bambas requests. The recorded chain of title
in this case is messy, with various unrecorded and unexplained assignments, one recorded but nonetheless
technically invalid assignment that had to be corrected and recorded again, and one link in the chain of title
missing for a few years. However, because the redemption period has expired, Bambas's right to challenge the
foreclosure is narrowly circumscribed by Michigan law, and none of the possible grounds of relief announced in
the case law supports his claim."); Hunt v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 11-14067, 2012 WL 6193865, at
*4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2012) ("Even if there were defects in the assignments discussed above, and even if such
defects would destroy the chain of title, Plaintiff nevertheless lacks standing to raise such defects. Plaintiff is not
a party to the assignments in question.").
107. Maraulo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 12-CV-10250, 2013 WL 530944, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11,2013)
("Furthermore, none of the facts alleged indicate that the assignment may subject Plaintiffs to a risk of having to
pay their mortgage twice. In fact, Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the assignor of the mortgage, American, went
out of business in 2008 and ceased to exist as a corporate entity. Given that the assignor does not exist, Plaintiffs
are not at any risk of paying the same claim twice, and have never alleged that they are at risk of such double
payment.") (internal citations omitted); Shumake v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 11 1-CV-353, 2012 WL
366923, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2012) ("Really, Shumake's injury is fairly traceable to the fact that he failed
to make his mortgage payments ... whether Shumake made his mortgage payments on time had nothing to do
with whether Chase validly assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. Either way, Shumake still had to make the
same payments-the assignment only altered to whom he made the payments; the assignment had no other
consequence to Shumake.") (internal citations omitted).
108. Siliga v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 161 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 500, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
109. Id
110. Zacks, supra note 34, at 571 (In one case, "the court reasoned that the original lender would not have
disbursed the loan funds if it had not assented to MERS being named as nominee on the related mortgage.
Similarly, many courts will correctly assume that a lender or successor owner would not buy a MERS loan if it
did not assent to MERS remaining its nominee with the associated rights to foreclose").
111. Woods v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that the debtor had
standing to challenge because the debtor "that MERS, as a mere 'nominee' for [the lender], never possessed a
legally transferable interest in Woods's mortgage, rendering any attempted assignments void, but ultimately the
court concluded that MERS did have such a legally transferrable interest"); Livonia Prop. Holdings v. 12840-
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D. Discovery Requests
Perhaps even more problematic than the disparate and inconsistent treatment of
assignments in foreclosure proceedings is the preliminary denial of debtor discovery
requests with respect to the validity of assignments. Since courts commonly discount the
viability of assignment-based defenses themselves, courts would be expected to deny the
availability of discovery on these issues as well.' 12 This is unsurprising, given the concerted
judicial effort to facilitate foreclosures as expeditiously as possible, and given the
"previewing" of the merits of cases before ruling on assignment-based defenses. 113
Accordingly, debtors may be prevented from determining whether grounds even exist to
challenge the ability of the assignee to foreclose upon the property, which undercuts the
substantive law granting the debtors such rights.
Such denials also undermine the very jurisprudence that this Article has analyzed. In
order to determine whether a debtor has standing to contest an assignment, courts often
look to the aforementioned void versus voidable distinction. But before discovery is
requested, it will often be impossible to predict what kind of defect an assignment might
have. Judges cannot, therefore, base their rulings on the assumption that an assignor would
not contest the assignment, or that any potential challenge would only make the assignment
voidable, rather than void, when they have not allowed a debtor to request any documents,
for example, that correspond with the events represented on the face of an assignment. It
is difficult indeed to discern how ajudge would know whether a challenge to an assignment
is serious without seeing any corresponding discovery.
E. Foreclosure as a Foregone Conclusion
Under these lines of analysis, if the foreclosure is inevitable because the debtor is in
default and the lender would necessarily desire a foreclosure, then the courts should not
put up unnecessary roadblocks to foreclosure by permitting procedural challenges. These
approaches, however, are deeply flawed because they are both predicated on an underlying
assumption that foreclosure would and should occur whenever the debtor is in default. This
Section discusses the reasons why this assumption often proves untrue in practice.
First, foreclosure is not an inevitable outcome. Foreclosure is only one of the myriad
of remedies or transactions that a lender may seek. For example, upon a debtor's default
under a note secured by a mortgage, the lender may be permitted to charge a higher rate of
• 114
interest or to demand additional fees. A lender could also agree to forbear and not pursue
12976 Farmington Road Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746-51 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (chain of title is
established exclusively through review of public records); Berry v. Main Street Bank, 977 F. Supp. 2d 766, 773
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (the court found that "even if the assignment were invalid, the record chain of title 'would not
be disturbed[,]' and therefore, would still reflect that Wells Fargo as the mortgagee," and a "'challenge to the
assignment on the grounds that it destroys the required chain of title lacks ment.') (internal citations omitted).
112. Indeed, it has been the experience of one of the co-authors that Florida courts routinely deny requests
for discovery with respect to assignments and the contexts in which they were made, regardless of the underlying
law governing assignments in those junsdictions.
113. See, e.g., Greg Allen, Fast-Paced Foreclosures: Florida's Rocket Docket, NAT'L. PUB. RADIO, (Oct.
21, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=130729666 (describing shortcuts
that some Florida courts took to facilitate fast resolution at the expense of many homeowners).
114. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency
Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2272 (2008) ("Lenders do not initiate, let alone complete, a formal
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its remedies under the loan agreement if it received further assurance from the debtor of
her ability to pay through additional upfront payments or third party guaranties, or if the
debtor agreed to pay additional fees to the lender. 115 A lender could also agree to modify
the loan that is secured by the mortgage if it determined that the new terms of the loan were
better than the alternative remedies it could seek. 1 16
As the above examples suggest, foreclosure is not inevitable, or even desirable, from
a lender's perspective. In most instances, the foreclosure process is very costly to the
lender. 117 The lender typically has to utilize the services of an attorney to pursue the
foreclosure and to pay the expenses associated with doing so. In addition, the value of the
property securing the loan may, at the time of the foreclosure, be worth less than the
outstanding amount of the loan. 118 If the property were to be resold by the lender, the lender
might expect to receive a price that is well below fair market value. 119 Lenders are not in
the business of buying and selling properties and typically would prefer not to own land.
120
foreclosure process in response to every breach of a mortgage obligation. Likewise, borrowers do not initiate
bankruptcy in response to every serious delinquency. Time permitting, a lender could allow a home owner to sell
property privately and use the proceeds to pay off the loan-the optimal approach to home exit within the existing
framework. Even if sale proceeds would not fully cover the loan, a lender could agree to a "short sale" and to
waive pursuit of the deficiency.").
115. 1 LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 3B:7 ("When circumstances make it impossible for the borrower
to make any payments at all for some time, a lender might consider a "forbearance plan" that would allow the
borrower to suspend payments or make reduced payments for a specified length of time In most cases the
borrower must have established a record of prompt payments with the lender before the onset of the present
difficulty, and it generally must be feasible to bring the loan out of default in no longer than 18 months. Normally
the lender will add the missed payments plus interest to the loan balance."); 30 N.J. PRAC., LAW OF MORTGAGES
§ 23.10 (2d ed. 2014) ("In some cases the mortgagee may (either before or after electing to accelerate) want to
enter into an agreement with the mortgagor to "forbear" to exercise its nght to foreclose in return for the
mortgagor's promise to "make up" the delinquent mortgage payments and resume regular payments at the end of
the period of forbearance.").
116. 30 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, LAW OF MORTGAGES § 23.10 (2d ed. 2014) ("[T]he mortgagee may prefer
to enter into an agreement "recasting" the mortgage contract either to allow amortization of the entire unpaid
indebtedness in larger installments over the remaining term of the mortgage or to allow amortization over a longer
term without increasing the period installment payments.").
117. Ralph Roberts, How Much Does A Foreclosure Cost?, REALTYTIMES.COM (Mar. 15, 2009), available
at http://realtytimes.com/agentnews/agentadvice 1/item/3788-20090316_foreclosure ("Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) released a policy report in May, 2008, in which it supports the fact that lenders are often the
biggest losers in foreclosure: 'While losses can vary widely, several independent studies find them to be generally
quite significant: over $50,000 per foreclosed home or as much as 30 to 60 percent of the outstanding loan
balance."').
118. Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45
Hous. L. REV. 683, 722 (2008) (stating that studies have "determined that in 90% of examined foreclosure sales,
the fair market value of the property was less than the outstanding loan amount").
119. Id. at 722 ("After taking title to the property, foreclosing lenders re-sold the property for an amount
greater than their investment in about half of the cases, but lost money overall after re-selling the properties.")
(citing Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure-An
Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L REV. 850, 865 (1985).
120. Eric Dash, As Lenders Hold Homes in Foreclosure, Sales Are Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/business/economy/23glut.html?pagewanted=all (Lenders "do not have the
staff and infrastructure to manage and sell" foreclosure properties. By holding property, lenders incur stigmatized
property and maintenance fees.); Jacoby, supra note 114, at 2262 ("Perhaps more significantly, real estate finance
experts no longer assume that delinquency on a mortgage should be equated with mortgage termination and a
borrower's home loss."); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure- The Uniform Nonjudicial
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Consequently, foreclosing upon the mortgage and reselling the property may cost the
lender more than modifying the loan agreement with the debtor.1  For example, the
modification may have economic terms that would ensure that the debtor would pay some
portion of the outstanding principal amount of the loan that is higher than that which the
lender would realize if the lender resold the property (or perhaps even equal to or less than
such amount, given lender reluctance to own and resell property).
It does not follow, therefore, that judges should assume that all lenders would desire
foreclosure in the event of a default and that it does not matter which entity forecloses upon
a mortgage. Instead, it is at best unclear whether purported assignors of a mortgage would
desire foreclosure upon default. This suggests that a more flexible standard for debtor
standing to challenge assignments would be appropriate.
What is clear, though, is that foreclosure is desirable from a judicial perspective.
Judges have been, implicitly or explicitly, charged with the task of clearing the backlog of
foreclosures and have accordingly carved a legal path that enables foreclosures to occur
more quickly and with less attorney effort.lZ2 In some instances, the funding for the courts
may be tied to their ability to reduce the backlog. 123 This creates an incentive for judges to
ignore documentary irregularities that would be questioned in an ordinary commercial
dispute. Whether clearing the backlog of mortgage cases is explicitly tied to funding for,
or is otherwise the express charge of the courts, judges may be reluctant to impose
procedural hurdles upon the purported assignee, particularly where the judge is not
sympathetic to a debtor that is admittedly delinquent in payments on the loan. 124 Of course,
the drive for speed with little regard to other considerations ignores some of the most
significant lessons of the housing crisis.
In the rush to originate loans for securitization, creditworthiness was given less and
less attention with the resulting effect that many homeowners were not able to make their
payments when, for example, adjustable interest rate loans eventually adjusted to market
rates. 125 Similarly and relatedly, as loans were increasingly bundled together in securitized
trusts, corollary documentation was not effectively monitored. 126 Then, when the crash
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1463 (2004) ("Most lenders do not want to foreclose, and do so only as a
last resort.").
121. See Dash, supra note 120 (mentioning the significant costs of foreclosure and noting lenders recent
willingness to negotiate with renters living in foreclosed homes).
122. See, e.g., FORECLOSURE INITIATIVE WORKGROUP, supra note 30 (establishing proposals to assist in
clearing a backlog of foreclosure cases, including actively propelling cases towards judgment); see also Matt
Taibbi, Invasion of the Home Snatchers, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/matt-taibbi-courts-heping-banks-screw-over-homeowners-
20101110 (providing a general description of expedited court procedures' effects on due process).
123. See FORECLOSURE INITIATIVE WORKGROUP, supra note 30 (noting the need for courts to keep their
docket clearance rate statistics).
124. Adolfo Pesquera, Miami-Dade Aggressively Pushes Foreclosure Cases Through System, DAILY BUS.
REV. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202613700227/MiamiDade-Aggressively-
Pushes-Foreclosure-Cases-Through-System?slretum=20150028155007 (access required) (quoting one judge as
saying "If you can't do [the trial] within an hour, you're not a trial attorney.").
125. See, e.g., Annamaria Andriotis & Shayndi Rice, Adjustable Rate Mortgages Make a Comeback, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702303546204579439171591130740 ("the [adjustable rate]
loans were last popular during the housing bubble and were fingered as a cause for many foreclosures").
126. See generally Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty Of
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necessitated legal services for a seismic number of foreclosure proceedings, foreclosure
attorneys and their clients' unceasing quest for faster litigation and resolution resulted in
robo-signing and a host of other ethical lapses, resulting in billions of dollars in
settlements. 127 Nonetheless, judges and court administrators seem to be wedded to the idea
that speeding up foreclosure cases is the only optimal policy.
Yet this approach, as with the other housing crisis issues driven largely by a demand
for faster results, is ultimately shortsighted. First, although a longer foreclosure process
costs lenders and servicers more, these costs may help incentivize servicers to settle more
cases, rather than enduring a long slog through the court system. 128 Similarly, the longer
time period may assist borrowers in bolstering their financial resources or in weathering a
financial hardship, again making settlement more likely. 129 Encouraging more settlements
benefits society as a whole, particularly those jurisdictions that have had higher numbers
of foreclosures. This is because preventing foreclosures can help eliminate significant
negative externalities. The normal neighborhood-level effects of foreclosed homes are
significant in terms of crime, blight, and reduced property values. 13  Producing
settlements, therefore, both alleviates those negative externalities and alleviates the
foreclosure backlog. Yet while some court systems have at least paid lip service to pro-
borrower assistance, such as mandatory mediation regimes, the typical judicial response to
a large number of cases lagging through a system has nonetheless remained in line with a
quicker process-at-all-costs mantra.
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In addition to the error of this policy on utilitarian grounds, it may also lead to many
courts giving unsympathetic treatment to defenses such as the challenges to assignments
raised here. Just as judges and court administrators seem to assume, without empirical
backing, that faster foreclosures are better for their respective jurisdictions, judges also
make assumptions regarding assignment-based defenses to foreclosure. In particular,
judges may assume that the purported assignee is in fact (or should be considered as) a
legally valid assignee and that the purported assignor knows about the purported
assignment and foreclosure proceedings, or that the assignor would be indifferent as to the
exercise of the foreclosure right. Each of these assumptions is questionable, and the judicial
employment of such assumptions is made even more dubious by the extrinsic desire of the
judicial system to reduce the number of foreclosure cases. The next Part addresses the
Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637, 662 (2013) (equating this documentation to a "myriad" of opinion letters).
127. Zacks, supra note 5, at 869-70.
128. Zacks, supra note 61, at 560.
129. Id. at 564.
130. Id. at 545.
131. See, e.g, FORECLOSURE INITIATIVE WORKGROUP, supra note 30 (explaining how the Florida court
system can reduce the backlog of cases). It should also be noted that these speed-oriented policies can negatively
affect the borrower, in a number of respects. The vast majority of homeowners do not retain counsel. See, e.g.,
Maggie Barron & Melanca Clark, Foreclosures A Crisis in Legal Representation, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(Oct. 6, 2009), available at http'//www.brennancenter.org/publication/foreclosures-cnsis-legal-representation
(citing a study that showed that in Stark County, Ohio, 86% of defendants in foreclosure cases lacked legal
counsel). The fact that a large number of cases lay dormant in many judicial foreclosure jurisdictions therefore
seems to indicate inattentive or incompetent legal counsel for banks and servicers. See Pesquera, supra note 124
(noting that "nothing happened when judges left the resolution of foreclosure cases up to the lenders and
homeowners"). As such, forcing cases to trial while knowing that most homeowners will be unrepresented is an
overwhelmingly pro-lender response, and completes much of the foreclosing entities' work for them whether they
actually want to proceed with their case or not.
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normative basis for granting debtors broader standing to challenge mortgage assignments
in the foreclosure context.
IV. JUSTIFYING DEBTOR STANDING TO CHALLENGE ASSIGNMENTS
Many justifications favor an approach permitting debtors to challenge the validity of
assignments on a broader basis and, at the very least, to permit discovery on the issues
presented. Some have expressed concern at the prospect of homeowners facing double
liability. 132 Scholars in other foreclosure contexts have made similar observations. 133 Put
simply, no litigant wants to face a lawsuit on a claim he has already paid to another party.
Challenges to assignments can help to ensure that the correct party is foreclosing and that
the borrower will not have to pay another eventual claimant. If one allows the proposition
that the foreclosing entity should be entitled to enforce the debt, then surely allowing
questions regarding transfers that can change that fact ought to be encouraged. It has been
suggested that this risk is particularly acute in the case of warehouse lending fraud, "in
which a crooked mortgage company sells the same note to multiple parties." 134
Nevertheless, critics suggest, and even debtor-friendly scholars concede, that the double
liability issue rarely presents itself. 135 But that possibility, no matter how remote, should
remain grounds for finding assignment transfer issues relevant to the ultimate facts of a
case, given the significance of a home foreclosure event.
1 36
Some courts have recognized the disconnect between the law's desire to exclude third
parties from exercising rights under another party's contract, and the application of the law
in the mortgage assignment and foreclosure situation. For example, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has a more permissive policy, permitting debtor challenges "to the extent
necessary to contest the foreclosing entity's authority to foreclose." 13 7 Accordingly, there
may be an "exception to the general rule precluding third-party standing to challenge a
contract . . . to the circumstances of a mortgagor challenging an 'invalid, ineffective, or
void' assignment of the mortgage . . . [and not one that] render[s] it merely
132. Miller v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, 881 F. Supp. 2d 825, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2012) ("In truth, the
prejudice is both plain and severe-foreclosure by the wrong entity does not discharge the homeowner's debt,
and leaves them vulnerable to another action . . by the true creditor"); LORD, supra note 18, at § 74:50 ("The
only way to protect the nghts of all persons is to require the debtor to join, by way of interpleader, the assignee
and the person who may be defrauded, offering to pay to whichever of these parties may be held entitled to receive
payment, and unless the debtor takes this course he should be liable to a defrauded third person.").
133 Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersections. The Right to Foreclose and the UCC, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1205, 1261 n.267 (2013) (arguing that standing is not a minor issue because of the possibility of double
liability); White, supra note 2, at 494-95.
134. White, supra note 2, at 494.
135. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 432 n.82 (I st ed. 1920) ("Wherever the debtor may
otherwise be liable again he should be allowed to interplead"). Williston cites cases where the debtor is held liable
where the debtor had notice of that the party enforcing the contractual right did not have good title to it. Id. See
also Renuart, supra note 133, at 1243 n 195 (listing 17 states that "join the right to foreclose on a mortgage that
secures the negotiable note" and have held that only the person entitled to enforce the note can foreclose on the
property).
136. Miller, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 832 ("Banks are neither private attorneys general nor bounty hunters, armed
with a roving commission to seek out defaulting homeowners and take away their homes in satisfaction of some
other bank's deed of trust.").
137. Chhun v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 84 A.3d 419,423 (R.I. 2014).
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voidable ... ." 138 This reasonable exception seems to protect against the possibility of
double liability. Without proof that a foreclosing entity owns a particular loan, courts ought
not be issuing final judgments given the risk that another party could potentially sue the
very same debtors on the very same loan.
Aside from the double liability rationale, courts should not "preview" merits of
foreclosure cases before ruling upon assignment challenges in light of the scholarly
observations that courts are overwhelmingly likely to find in favor of banks and lenders.
Given that foreclosure is a uniquely traumatic outcome resulting from the court system, the
forcible removal of a person from their home should not be given any less fundamental
fairness than a criminal proceeding. Thus, the rapid escalation of court time frames, with
rapidly paced foreclosure trials set up for the convenience of lenders' counsel, or the
previewing of cases to assume away assignment issues, should be avoided.
Legislatures have democratically enacted judicial foreclosure frameworks in many
states, which should be respected in light of the harsh remedy that foreclosure represents.
Judges, therefore, should not downplay or seek to avoid the serious consumer protection
concerns that judicial foreclosure frameworks represent. Minimizing assignment
challenges given the previewing of a case's merits, as in the cases discussed in this Article,
simply dissolves the robust right to defense that legislators would seem to have had in mind
when enacting judicial oversight of the foreclosure process. Put more simply, courts must
afford foreclosure defendants the same rights that legislators expect in all judicial
proceedings: the right not to be judged before all the relevant and admissible facts have
been discovered, or at least been made discoverable.
A more procedural point supporting the allowance of assignment challenges stems
from the posture in which assignments are sometimes presented in cases. Most of the cases
examined for these issues involved cases where the assignment formed a major, if not the
only, piece of evidence proving (or disproving) a bank's standing after a loan transfer.
Thus, homeowners may be presented with these assignments as evidence, yet not be able
to-reciprocally-take discovery or ask relevant questions at trial. This suggests a
procedural inequality in which banks and foreclosing entities can propose a theory of
transfer that is above reproach and not subject to question, despite banks' previously
publicized issues with improper documentation.
An analogy can be made to the rights of leaseholder tenants. Courts and legislatures
have recognized the need for the security of tenure. 13 9 Courts, in particular, have expanded
the ability of tenants to raise particular defenses against wrongful or troubling evictions
over time. 14 Although some have argued that summary eviction statutes do not go far
138. Mruk v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 82 A.3d 527, 536 (R.I. 2013) (finding such an exception
but limiting it to "private residential mortgagors challenging the foreclosure of their homes").
139. Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenurefor Residential Tenants: Good Faith as a Limitation
on the Landlord's Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 490 (1985) ("Although imposition of the warranty of
habitability has been the most dramatic aspect of the landlord-tenant 'revolution,' other changes have also
significantly increased the rights of tenants. Procedural devices previously available to landlords, such as self-
help eviction, distraint of goods, and summary eviction, have been abolished or drastically altered."); Spector,
supra note 38, at 165 (noting court and legislative action to limit landlord power to evict tenants); Williams, supra
note 39, at 1191 ("Protecting a tenant's tenure is not a foreign or unusual action for federal and/or state
governments. Both have taken steps to shelter tenants from unmerited ejections by landlords.").
140. Williams, supra note 39, at 1191 ("For many years, jurisdictions have struggled to provide protection
to tenants against the whims of their landlords. Jurisdictions have focused on: (1) eviction-being physically or
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enough to secure the tenure of tenants, the historical involvement of courts in tenant-
landlord conflicts and the development of tenant protection law both suggest that courts
are well-positioned to protect debtors from improper foreclosures and to interpret the
assignment and other contract law issues presented. 141
Notably, empirical literature demonstrates that foreclosure can produce physical
health effects; emotional health effects such as depression, stress, and shaming; and severe
credit effects that can, in some instances, restrict a homeowner's future job prospects. 142
Accordingly, foreclosure should trigger robust due process protections. At their most basic,
these would include the right to ask questions about key pieces of evidence that will be
introduced at trial or in a final judgment hearing. Yet, as we have seen, many courts are
reluctant to allow discovery regarding assignments, even though proving that a given
assignment is invalid may defeat the immensely consequential foreclosure judgment.
Beyond due process or tenure protections, the most significant benefit accruing to
individual homeowners permitted to challenge assignments may be thought of in terms of
time and leverage. As to time, such challenges would likely increase the time necessary to
foreclose, which in turn increases costs to lenders. 143 Thus, homeowners would accrue
more opportunities to work out a settlement. Further, the increased costs to lenders may
provide additional incentives to lenders to grant more favorable concessions to
homeowners. 144 It is possible, as some contend, that lengthening the foreclosure process
could spur a delay in the resolution of the real estate market. 145 Nevertheless, many of the
problems associated with foreclosures-like crime, blight, and depressed surrounding
housing values-have been shown to be caused primarily by vacancies, not foreclosure
filings themselves. 
146
Such an expansion of the hurdles to foreclosure, and the resultant delays, may increase
borrowing costs and decrease credit offers to potential homeowners in the future. 147 This
constructively evicted; (2) rent-preventing tenants from capricious rent increases; and (3) discrimination-
protecting classes of tenants from discrimination in obtaining housing."); Spector, supra note 38, at 171 (finding
many jurisdictions expanded the defenses available to tenants "not only by imposing warranties of habitability,
but also by permitting tenants to assert them defensively within the summary eviction proceeding without any
meaningful change to existing procedures.").
141. Spector, supra note 38, at 209 ("Just as courts and legislatures adopted changes in the substantive law
to reflect the similarities of residential housing transactions to transactions for general consumer goods and
services, they must now insure [sic] that the procedures used to resolve disputes accommodate those similarities.
So long as summary proceedings continue to isolate the issue of possession from other issues related to the
tenancy, they diminish the benefits tenants have achieved through changes in the substantive law.").
142. Zacks, supra note 61, at 544-45.
143. Id. at 567 (citing empirical studies showing that "longer foreclosure times increase lender losses").
144. See Renuart, supra note 133, at 1212-13 (noting that the ability to challenge mortgages would provide
borrowers with better negotiating leverage); David A. Dana, Why Mortgage "Formalities" Matter, 24 LOy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 505, 508-09 (2012) (suggesting that the increased cost to banks of complying with procedural
requirements would encourage them to negotiate modifications or other workout transactions with borrowers)
145. Dana, supra note 144, at 505-06 (noting that banks would argue that strict judicial treatment with
respect to procedural requirements would "slow down the foreclosure process and delay the elimination of the
huge backlog of mortgages in default.").
146. Zacks, supra note 61, at 547-48 ("[Wle should not necessarily equate foreclosure filings with crime.
Rather, it is vacancy itself-including vacancies that may result from foreclosures-that can lead to increased
crime").
147. See generally id (providing an in-depth discussion on the impact of pro-borrower legislation on
individual homeowners and society).
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argument fails to account for the democratic nature of judicial oversight of foreclosure
processes. That is to say, many state legislatures have enacted a process by which
foreclosures are afforded the same processes and procedures as any other civil lawsuit,
regardless of potential future credit rationing externalities. Efforts to curtail the routine
discovery questions asked in any given case, or to restrict the number of defenses a
defendant may raise, therefore, represent a unilateral judicial action not in accordance with
the planned foreclosure framework.
If judges and court administrators do not appreciate that banks and lenders' attorneys
have to prove cases in the same way as any other civil lawsuit, and that, correspondingly,
foreclosure cases take longer than in non-judicial states, this is a question that the
legislature can easily address. In this arena, it does not behoove the courts to remake what
the legislature has already deliberated upon and purposely enacted. One could presume,
after all, that legislators have wrestled with the question of whether lending is more
restricted or expensive in a more consumer-friendly foreclosure regime, and whether those
costs are worth the benefit in turn of having more accurate and fair proceedings.
Accordingly, any increase in borrowing costs may already have been weighed against the
costs imposed upon debtors that are unable to combat an improper foreclosure. Thus, any
additional time required by allowing assignment challenges, and any resultant increases in
lending costs, would seem to have already been deemed an acceptable risk by legislatures.
The potential benefits to such challenges are worth exploring further.
Aside from advantages accruing to individual homeowners, permitting challenges
more liberally could improve court systems. First, allowing challenges would promote the
integrity of the public records. This point has been made repeatedly in the context of
MERS, 148 and no persuasive rationale can be given for failing to give the same
consideration to assignment issues generally. Surely public records should be accurate and
correct, and one would think that it is a duty of courts to ensure that improper assignments
have not been recorded. In fact, MERS has already faced multi-million dollar lawsuits for
its failure to record assignments that were, under some theories, required to have been
recorded. 149 Given the sheer number of faulty documents that were brought to light during
the height of the "robo-signing" crisis, courts should be more, and not less, vigilant against
possibly fraudulent recordings in public records.
These public records goals are also backed by concerns regarding possible title issues
in eventual sales or purchases of foreclosed properties. Such problems have been raised in
regards to, for example, satisfactions of mortgages. 150 In turn, these difficulties affect a
large portion of the population that has not been foreclosed. Viewing assignment
challenges in the prism of debtors trying to "win a free home" ignores the detrimental
effects that many commentators allege that MERS and faulty assignments may have on
unrelated parties.
Such title issues could be the "single most troubling legal question that remains
148. See, e.g, Peterson, supra note 41, at 1405 (describing a MERS senior vice president acknowledging
that "MERS is owned and operated by and for the mortgage industry.").
149. See generally Zacks, supra note 41 (describing the recent surge of county clerk and qui tam lawsuits
challenging MERS' role in foreclosures and MERS' effect on the transparency of public records).
150 See White, supra note 2, at 495-96 (describing title problems that arise due to the validity of mortgage
satisfactions).
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unanswered with respect to MERS's legal foundation." 15 1 Specifically, these concerns
regard whether MERS mortgages will protect lienors against subsequent purchasers or
bankruptcy trustees. Again, these effects do not merely concern the specific debtor or
homeowner, but may cause chaos on title transfers in society at large. Allowing assignment
challenges and discovery on such issues can ensure that loan transfers were properly
completed, thereby increasing the accuracy of the public records and helping to prevent
future title problems.
On a related point, such increased scrutiny may help to incentivize better
documentation practices from banks and servicers in the future. If entities processing
securitization documentation, producing assignments, or filing these documents in court
know that courts will be vigilant on assignment issues, they will assumedly take care to
ensure that their assignments are proper and correct. 152 Aside from the foreclosure
"industry" itself, other areas of law that use assignments may also increase their efforts
towards quality control. Debt collection, for example, has also attracted criticism for its
questionable documentation in courts. 153 Thus, as evidence exists that banks are still
making many of the same problematic mistakes regarding transfer documentation, courts
can provide an important spur towards reform. 
154
This prediction has been borne from the course of events concerning MERS-related
controversies and concerning foreclosure law firm practices. In regards to MERS, most of
its reforms have been directly related to challenges brought in courts. For instance, when
the housing crisis became acute, the myriad of challenges to MERS' right to bring a
foreclosure action in its own name produced a widely disparate and conflicting
jurisprudence. 15 5 As a result of the growing controversy, MERS eventually changed its
procedures so it would not foreclose in its own name. 156 Without courts allowing such
challenges to MERS' standing, MERS would have had no reason to alter its practices.
Similarly, faced with the embarrassing revelations that many of its "officers" could not
name basic facts about MERS, the company apparently enacted some form of basic training
for persons signing their names to assignments. 157 Yet without the depositions requested
as part of routine discovery in civil litigation, these shortcomings and reforms would not
have occurred.
To paint a rather different scenario, consider the alternative. With a disinterested
judiciary interested mainly in clearing cases, high volume foreclosure law firms were able
to commit a significant number of errors and frauds. 158 In some cases attorneys and their
firms were able to file false lost-note claims, to sign affidavits on behalf of clients without
151. Peterson, supra note 41, at 1394-95.
152. See Donald J. Kochan, Certainty of Title: Perspectives After the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis on the
Essential Role of Effective Recording Systems, 66 ARK. L. REV. 267, 312 (2013) (stating that "[i]f courts begin
insisting on formalities, financial institutions will be encouraged to adopt a higher standard of care ").
153. See Dana, supra note 144, at 104 (suggesting that, during the next wave of securitizations, banks would
show more care with respect to procedural requirements).
154. Renuart, supra note 37, at 127 (suggesting that banks have not reformed their practices years after the
robo-signing scandal).
155. See generally Zacks, supra note 34 (examining the role and issues surrounding MERS).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See generally Zacks, supra note 5 (examining numerous instances of misconduct in high-volume
foreclosure firms).
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the authority to do so, to file documents signed by attorneys who had already left the
particular firm, signing blank documents with information to be filled in later, among other
violations. 159 Yet these same attorneys faced little, if any, consistent pressure from courts
to reform their ways. Accordingly, many of the bad acts continued for years before any
consequences were meted out.
One way to evaluate such ethical lapses is to be guilty of the same previewing that
courts partake in when analyzing assignment challenges; if the debtor is in default, then it
should not matter if false or inappropriate documents have fouled up the court system. Such
a notion, though, would probably offend those who value the basic integrity of the courts.
Disregarding assignment challenges, and disallowing discovery on such issues, as in the
case of foreclosure firm misconduct, can have a detrimental effect. Without asking
questions about the assignments, the courts will never discover whether the scale of
problematic assignments is indeed daunting, or whether it is a rare phenomenon.
Conversely, as in the case of MERS controversies, court monitoring and litigant challenges
can result in reform.
V. CONCLUSION
Scholars have made various suggestions addressing mortgage transfer concerns. First,
lenders could, as a prerequisite to foreclosure, be required to produce a full loan transfer
history with supporting documentation. This would presumably eliminate many of the
transparency concerns noted above. 16° Other scholars accord with this idea as a key
protection to borrowers seeking to avoid questionable foreclosures. 161 Alternatively, the
government could merge notes and mortgages into one document, rendering assignments
less necessary and relevant.162 Finally, MERS could be re-designed or nationalized as a
national recording database, again rendering assignments less relevant. 163
This Article's ultimate suggestions are more cautious and incremental, in part because
of the controversy and political wrangling that either of the significant aforementioned
proposals would entail. First, to the extent necessary, appellate courts and legislatures could
take measures to ensure that discovery on mortgage assignments are treated as discovery
in any other civil litigation. Put another way, the court should reinforce the notion that the
scope of discovery is relatively wide, especially given the direct relevance assignments
have to the ultimate question of standing to foreclose. If judges are sufficiently confident
that foreclosure will be granted in the vast majority of cases anyway, then it makes little
sense to prevent slight delays in the process to allow for discovery. Such discovery would
prevent fraud, whether a common or rare occurrence, and also may have the positive
benefit of encouraging settlement where appropriate, as explained above. To the extent
necessary, legislatures also could enact corollary documentation requirements when
159. Id. at 870.
160. White, supra note 2, at 497 (suggesting that legislatures require lenders to document the complete
transfer history of mortgage documents prior to foreclosing); but see Levitin, supra note 126, at 662 (2013)
(arguing that such requirements would make transfers hard and increase borrower costs).
161. John P. Hunt et al., Rebalancing Public and Private in the Law of Mortgage Transfer, 62 AM. U. L.
REV. 1529, 1564 (2013) (outlining the problems with American mortgage transfer law).
162. White, supra note 2, at 498.
163. Zacks, supra note 34, at 607-08.
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assignments are used as evidence, and appellate courts could stress, again, that judicial
foreclosure litigants are to be afforded the same rights as litigants in other commercial
disputes.
Legislatures and court administrators also should resist the urge to speed up
foreclosure processes and, more specifically, to tie court funding to specific case resolution
time frames. Having such goals can lead to improper incentives for judges to hustle cases
along at the risk of denying basic procedural safeguards and ignoring questionable
documentation. Ignoring ubiquitous calls to expedite proceedings, along with the threat of
defunding, may be helpful in ensuring that assignment challenges, when valid, will be
given a fair hearing.
Finally, state bar associations and state attorney generals should focus their attention
in the "robo-signing" context on assignments. Although most of the robo-signing scandals
and servicer settlements to date stemmed from questionable affidavits, this Article has
argued that assignments give rise to potentially even more significant consequences for
society at large. Whereas affidavits may only affect a given case, improper assignments
will be on the public records in perpetuity and have implications for title insurance and
future purchasers. State bar associations and state attorney generals can, with proper
investigations of law firms and document processing firms involved with such questionable
assignments, encourage reform of the very system that churned out such problematic
documentation.
This Article asserts that adjudicators should be more willing to grant debtors in
foreclosure standing to contest questionable mortgage assignments. Current adjudicative
approaches contribute to a system where certain litigants, merely due to the subject area of
their dispute (foreclosures), are at risk of being afforded less procedural protection than
similarly situated litigants in other disputes. The substantive protections afforded by
standing to protect one's rights should not depend solely upon the nature of the lawsuit at
issue or an adjudicator's perception of the importance or likely outcome of such lawsuits.

